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Nous ne défendons pas la nature, 
nous sommes la nature qui se défend
ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes
The parts of this book could be arranged with complete impunity 
around one of the brightest stars in the firmament of philosophy 
and aesthetic reflection. Moreover, that star does not merely sug-
gest a hypothesis of thematic correlation between the individual 
parts, but raises the problem of their own tendency (as parts) to 
have always implied a recomposition. The reference is to Kant’s 
third Critique, where the overall view is a preliminary condition 
to any fragment of knowledge and experience: if in the following 
pages it is possible to find a certain number of connections, it is 
also in relation to the problem that Kant meant to resolve by identi-
fying a faculty that binds the exercise of the intellect to the latency 
of an organic framework. A framework without any content, as is 
well known, except precisely that of the propensity of each phe-
nomenon to be first and foremost part of something. According 
to Kant, it is only by virtue of this propensity that we can enter 
into a relationship with the world, that we can feel and perceive 
it and that we enable it to mediate, through the feeling of pleas-
ure, the experience of ourselves. This is not a requirement of the 
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world, since it does not fall within the phenomenal and mechanical 
horizon of knowledge, but an indispensable projection for the sub-
ject to establish contact with the evidence of any singularity. And 
it will be precisely to the release of this evidence that one of the 
first and most enthusiastic readers of the third Critique, Goethe, will 
immediately associate the notions of form, morphology and meta-
morphosis, pinpointing an opening which, through Kantian reflec-
tion, can lead to the topics we will discuss.
Once again it will be useful to refer to the moment in which Kant 
had to devise a way to reconcile the conclusions he had reached 
with the first two Critiques, to identify in the reflective judgment 
the faculty to connect the limits of the concept to the freedom of 
desire. In the aesthetic judgment this connection is associated 
with the free play between the formal involvement of intellect and 
the work of imagination, in the sublime the mathematical limit-
lessness or the dynamic power of nature are the ones who imply 
the belonging of man to a dimension further than that of the limit 
that they make available, while the teleological judgment cannot 
but go beyond the legality of knowledge every time it is impossi-
ble to proceed from causes to effects. It would seem that bringing 
together these three performances of subjective reality, is the dis-
covery that our way of approaching it cannot avoid considering it 
a product in itself, that is, the outcome of a process which, while 
remaining unknown, must always refer to a more comprehensive 
explanation. It is to this preliminary and necessary reference that 
Kant gives the name of purposiveness, both in terms of the corre-
lation between the individual parts that are characterized as parts 
of a harmonic whole, thus seemingly being involved in the mechan-
ical production of its contingency (Cassirer, 2016a, p. 258), and in 
the sense of their tension towards the discovery of a concept that 
would make them finally objectifiable (§IV-V). In the absence of this 
tension, not only would the reflective judgment get lost in a series 
of antinomies, losing its regulative and heuristic function (§70), 
but the very possibility of knowing anything would disappear, since 
even the apodictic use of reason and the determinative judgment 
must anticipate a moment of indetermination that allows them to 
imagine the opportunity to subsume the parts to an already known 
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universal law (Deleuze, 1984, pp. 58-59). Therefore unlike what was 
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, if indeed “every subsumption 
contains an aesthetically reflective passage” (Desideri, 2003, pp. 
72-73), form will now designate a reflection of contingency in the 
imagination that invents or experiences the universal (Deleuze, 
1984, p. 47), anchoring the third Critique to the idea that in the 
development of any kind of knowledge the imagination is not less 
necessary than the intellect, that is to say one of the transcendental 
preconditions – so to speak – of Goethe’s morphology (Cassirer, 
1970, p. 98).
Ernst Cassirer spoke in this regard of a double tangency: the first, 
negative, for which both Kant and Goethe would limit themselves 
to consider art and nature as relationships, without ever objectify-
ing them in the perspective of final causes; the second, positive, for 
which the role attributed by both to the form adheres to an ideal 
of knowledge that never poses the unrelated problem of ground, 
but identifies it with the formation and transformation of organic 
natures (pp. 67-68). To what he defines positive tangency, however, 
Cassirer would probably not be willing to make it undertake the her-
meneutical twist that we are imposing on it, since while arriving at 
the qualification of a regulative and not constitutive purpose, which 
can therefore adhere to the dynamics of formal links, in Kant it 
would be difficult to deny schematism the programmatically unre-
lated function of ground. Unless we accept the proposal recently 
formulated by Catherine Malabou and allow the living being as an 
“intrusion of the non-transcendental into critical rationality” to ret-
roact on the entire architecture of the system, as if the ground were 
led through the vicissitudes of a coming of age novel that only in the 
last pages forced it to admit that it had never been anything other 
than an “effect” or a “surface structure” (Malabou, 2020, pp. 72-76). 
That is, a place where things happen, without it being only the place 
(as an innate faculty) or things (involving a shift into empiricism) 
that determine the structure of the events. Thus, identified with the 
possibility of this happening and pushed to its maximum degree 
of immanence, the definition of trascendental can actually prelude 
to a programme that articulates the limited horizon of knowledge 
to the free contingency of forms: a taking-shape as a “surface” 
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interaction between the reflection that objects generate in the 
imagination and their exclusively regulatory tendency to activate in 
judgment the aspiration to a concept that will have made them known. 
Such an interpretation should clearly involve a much tighter work of 
analysis, but the point of this introduction is not to hastily establish 
what Kant really said, but to show the direction in which the indi-
vidual insights collected in this volume could possibly be oriented 
towards. From this point of view, Deleuze and Malabou’s interpreta-
tions seem to support the opinion that Goethe had already expressed 
about the relationship between the first and the third Critiques, 
as he recalls:
In the days when I was trying, if not to penetrate deeply, to 
make the most of Kant’s doctrine, my impression, at times, 
was that the excellent man proceeded in a maliciously 
ironic way, now seemingly anxious to limit to a minimum 
our ability to know, now casting a sidelong glance beyond 
the boundaries set by himself. Likely it had not escaped him 
how much presumption and pedantry man displays when, 
armed with few experience, he immediately arrogates to 
make judgments and hastily claims to establish this or that, 
to saddle objects with the first thought that passes through 
his head. Therefore our Master limits the man who thinks to 
a logical and discursive form of judgment, denies him deter-
minative judgment; but then, after having cornered or even 
exasperated us, he allows more liberal concessions to be 
wrested from him and allows us to make the use we want 
of the freedom that, in some way, he recognizes us (Goethe, 
1983, p. 140).
And if we allow the transcendental for a moment to correspond 
to a “surface effect”, even Cassirer’s Goethe is left with only the 
excellent reasons that led him to reflect himself without reserve 
in the reading of the third Critique. The same problem that in Kant 
would be represented by the danger of confusing reflective judg-
ment with determinative judgment, attributing to nature a purpose 
that in reality remains the misleading synonym of what is free to 
happen, in Goethe’s scientific research would be introduced by 
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the reference to an observation and classification criterion which 
risks being equally inhibitory and which corresponds to the notion 
of “type”. A concept, explains Cassirer, which also retains all its 
importance in Goethe’s biology, but only as long as its retraction is 
grasped. Because it is not a question of renouncing the recognition 
of what unites the objects of investigation, but of establishing that 
their commonality can be made manifest only in transformation. In 
other words:
We have life only in a colored reflection of life, and exist-
ence is not comprehensible or accessible to us except as 
it unfolds itself before us in change. This peculiar intermin-
gling of being and becoming, of permanence and change, 
was comprehended in the concept of form, which became 
for Goethe the fundamental biological concept. Form is akin 
to type, but the geometrical fixity of the type is no longer 
suited to the form (Cassirer, 1950, p. 139).
Unlike what happens in reference to the application of the concept 
of type, which subordinates movement to the stability of perma-
nent features, for there to be form it is essential to subordinate the 
manifestation of duration to the activity of changes. The form can 
be defined only in terms of taking-form, therefore, effectively reduc-
ing the type to “what the old man of Königsberg himself calls the 
adventure of reason” (Goethe, 1983a, p. 140) and which coincides 
precisely with the objective of the third Critique, to which Kant had 
entrusted the task of establishing what leeway to encroach on the 
limits imposed by the intellect was to be granted to human hope. 
In fact, Kant writes:
The agreement of so many genera of animals in a certain 
common schema, which seems to lie at the basis not only 
of their skeletal structure but also of the arrangement of 
their other parts, and by which a remarkable simplicity of 
basic design has been able to produce such a great variety 
of species by the shortening of one part and the elongation 
of another, by the involution of this part and the evolution 
of another, allows the mind at least a weak ray of hope that 
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something may be accomplished here with the principle of 
the mechanism of nature, without which there can be no 
natural science at all. This analogy of forms, insofar as in 
spite of all the differences it seems to have been generated 
in accordance with a common prototype, strengthens the 
suspicion of a real kinship among them in their generation 
from a common proto-mother, through the gradual approach 
of one animal genus to the other, from that in which the 
principle of ends seems best confirmed, namely human 
beings, down to polyps, and from this even further to 
mosses and lichens, and finally to the lowest level of nature 
that we can observe, that of raw matter (§80).
Therefore, to the hope that could transform into certainty, corre-
sponds the contradictory tendency to confuse reflective judgment 
with a property of nature, a regulative principle with a constitutive 
principle, the analogy of forms with objective reality and the taxo-
nomic classification of phenomena. But it is an absurd confusion, 
continues Kant, “by which is meant the generation of an organized 
being through the mechanism of crude, unorganized matter”, so as 
to render less absurd the adventure of reason induced to assume 
that an organization can be attributed even to crude matter (§80). 
At this point “the specific form was preformed virtualiter” (§81), 
but still in relation to a conception of finality as a category a priori 
of teleological judgment that cannot be produced in the truthful-
ness of scientific theories, such as preformationism, which asso-
ciate a phenomenal and therefore objective definition to the form 
in potency. On the contrary, the way in which the functions of this 
internal form and its analogies will be understood in the develop-
ment of critical philosophy is consistent with Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach’s epigenetic model, which involves an adherence to 
vitalism or an opening to the constitutive value of judgment that 
the third Critique does not admit (Lenoir, 1980; Look, 2006), but 
to which Kant acknowledges above all the merit of starting “all 
physical explanation of formations with organized matter”, that 
is to say from a supposition external to the laws of physics that 
coincides with the adventure of reason on which Goethe himself 
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does not hesitate to embark. And this is because Blumenbach too, 
writes Kant,
declares it to be contrary to reason that raw matter should 
originally have formed itself in accordance with mechani-
cal laws, that life should have arisen from the nature of the 
lifeless, and that matter should have been able to assem-
ble itself into the form of a self-preserving purposiveness 
by itself; at the same time, however, he leaves natural 
mechanism an indeterminable but at the same time also 
unmistakable role under this inscrutable principle of an 
original organization, on account of which he calls 
the faculty in the matter in an organized body (in dis-
tinction from the merely mechanical formative power 
[Bildungskraft] that is present in all matter) a formative drive 
[Bildungstrieb] (§81).
And here is how the living, as organized matter that stimulates 
reason to venture beyond the confines of reason, seems to lead 
the development of critical philosophy to the identification of life 
(the power of matter) with a tendency towards formation which 
together with the mechanisms of nature also informs their objec-
tive knowledge, reserving for it a role that cannot be determined 
but not even disowned. It is in this way that the third Critique can 
imply a backward action on the overall system of transcendental 
philosophy, subordinating the very possibility of knowing and expe-
riencing the world to the analogous and baseless adventures of 
reflective judgment (Huneman, 2007, p. 91; Breitenbach, 2014). 
Which cannot help but approach a natured nature (natura naturata), 
that is to say one that is already provided with the reference to a 
universal container, but which precisely in the continuous manifes-
tation of this limit must presuppose the no less regulatory activity 
of an autopoietic matter that is free to take form (Weibel, 2018): 
a naturing nature (natura naturans) whose tendency to formation 
is confirmed by the analogical and not apodictic structure (as if, 
als ob) of judgment itself (Richards, 2000, p. 31). Kant states this 
very clearly in reference to the idea of  the supreme being: 
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Now in order to avoid a misunderstanding that can easily 
arise, it is most necessary to mention here, first, that we can 
think these properties of the highest being only by means 
of analogy. For how would we investigate its nature, noth-
ing similar to which can be shown to us by experience? 
Second, that by means of this analogy we only think this 
being, and do not thereby cognize it and attribute anything 
to it theoretically… (§88).
It is not possible to ground the analogy outside the analogical pro-
cedure, that is to say actively thinking according to analogy, which 
responds only to the desire that is expressed and takes shape 
through the practice of thought. In other words, “the analogical 
discourse is supported exclusively by the free decision that leads 
it” (Marty, 1989, p. 469), losing its validity at the exact moment in 
which it should be abandoned to a conclusion. Therefore, with ref-
erence to the objective of creating a bridge between the limits of 
knowledge and the freedom of desire, Jacques Derrida can legiti-
mately argue that “the recourse to analogy, the concept and effect 
of analogy are or make the bridge itself […]. The abyss calls for 
analogy – the active recourse of the whole Critique – but analogy 
plunges endlessly into the abyss as soon as a certain art is needed 
to describe analogically the play of analogy” (Derrida, 1987, p. 36). 
If on the one hand it is an effect that determines the importance of 
the analogy, just as the surface on which Malabou will see the tran-
scendental happening is an effect, on the other hand it would seem 
that in Derrida a tension to the cogency of ground can continue to 
act, where the necessary recourse to “some art” is not evaluated 
in the new perspective of a free play between the intellect and the 
imagination that adheres more comprehensively to the dynamics 
of the three Critiques, but through the figure of the endless sinking, 
which laments a loss and restores the primacy of pure reason. That 
the analogy can only be explained analogically, on the contrary, 
could entail a transformation of the very idea of ground, imposing 
on it the “dynamically fluid form” which is resolved “in the purely 
conditional logic of presupposition” (Desideri, 2003, pp. 92-93). 
To the reflection on the living cannot but correspond a faculty no 
less unfounded, plastic and therefore living: this seems to me the 
15
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road on which criticism could actually encounter the interpretation 
that Goethe will give it, where the relationship between the subject 
and the object of morphology is resolved in the movement of a life 
that observes itself (Pinotti, 2013, p. 19). An encounter certainly 
complicated by the observation that “in order to examine what is – 
now – we must admit a previous activity” which risks dragging the 
study of nature into a theological dimension, but which can also 
be propitiated in a more earthly way by establishing that “when 
an organic being appears, the unity and freedom of the formative 
impulse [Bildungstrieb] are incomprehensible without the concept 
of metamorphosis” (Goethe, 1983b, p. 143).
To the same encounter, can then lead the story of the exorcisms that 
the era of the scientific revolution opposed to this concept. In the 
“long sixteenth century” we witness the unfolding of a new rationality 
which, making use of microscopes, experiments, metaphysics and 
theatrical works, contrasts the same tendency towards the muta-
bility of forms which, according to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, 
still constituted the main argument confirming human greatness. 
That tendency will be averted in the first place by the theory of 
spontaneous generation becoming outdated and the emergence 
of preformism, two alternatives that in the Methodology of the tel-
eological judgment will be defined by Kant as equally inadmissible. 
But in the meantime Racine will have banned the metamorphosis 
even from the repertoire of theatrical solutions and the continuous 
metamorphosis of the monad, in Leibniz, will have been entrusted 
to the superintendence of an eminent cause that had always pre-
ordained them. I will address this war on the concept in the first 
chapter, the real stakes of which could be summarized by referring 
to the morphological tensions between the formed form (forma for-
mata) and the forming form (forma formans), two categories that 
Cassirer defines precisely along the same lines of the scholastic 
distinction between natured nature and nature naturans or imply 
that in the distance between the past participle and the present 
participle there is the moment of transition “from what has become 
to the principle of becoming” (Cassirer, 2003, p. 54). And it is in this 
same perspective and for the value it can assume in the debates 
relating to the so-called anthropocene that my reconstruction will 
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be initiated by a reference by Marx to the subject that is “not to 
remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement 
of becoming”.
With the next chapter I will try to illustrate the reasons that Marx 
could oppose to the way in which forms are conceptualized by 
Bruno Latour in his critique of the analyses on the fetishistic char-
acter of the commodity. It seems plausible to me to suspect Latour 
not only of having misunderstood Marx, but of anchoring this mis-
understanding to the conviction that the Capital is part of a “long 
series” of correspondences to the paradigmatic gesture with which 
Kant would have made a clear separation between the pure form 
of the subject and the equally pure form of the noumenon. While 
the relationship between the first and third Critique established 
by Goethe seems to evoke the image of the Freudian primordial 
horde, because such would appear the scene in which the results 
of schematism devour its ground, with Latour’s interpretation we 
are standing before Dante’s count Ugolino, since only within the 
limits of pure reason is it possible to reduce matter to the thing 
in itself and form to structures that are always identical to them-
selves on which the subject of knowledge is constituted (Sgarbi, 
2016, p. 94). The problem of teleology, on the contrary, is precisely 
that of separating the organized matter of the living (as Kant him-
self explains) from the general concept of matter, reserving a less 
passive role for the specific form in relation to the forces that deter-
mine it (Bildungskraft) to assign it the impure and adventurous 
consistency of the cause of itself, because this is when the contin-
gency of the forms is defined by the impetus to the expression of 
their own form (Bildungstrieb) in relation to what some have called 
a “free cause” (Zumbach, 1984, p. 99). If Marx’s work is really to be 
included in the “long series” of compulsions to repeat Kant’s ges-
ture, then, it is not in reference to the presumed survival of pure 
forms in the logic that presides over the analysis of the fetishistic 
character of the commodity, as Latour wrongly claims, but for an 
almost opposite reason: it is the conception of form relative to the 
organized matter of the living, in fact, which now seems to extend 
its coherence to the relationship with the general concept of matter 
in the perspective of historical materialism, where the precondition 
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of a crude matter, which is therefore separated from the historical 
and social forms that implement it, corresponds only to an ideolog-
ical resource of the bourgeoisie. 
On the contrary, for the materialist who would have been prepared 
to conceive “the evolution of the economic formation of society as 
a process of natural history”, the enigmatic character of the com-
modity can only refer to its own form (Marx, 1990). Not for noth-
ing, as I will try to argue in the third chapter, it is precisely on the 
oppositions between inert matter and organized matter, pure act 
and impure act, force and form of life that the differences between 
Giovanni Gentile and Antonio Gramsci, as interpreters of the Theses 
on Feuerbach and the related notion of praxis, seem to insist on. If 
in the pages on the process of exchange Marx had already taken 
steps to grasp the limit of the reduction to “pure phenomenal form” 
and to attribute to it the “eighteenth-century” task of converting the 
social character of things into an arbitrary product of human reflec-
tion, Gramsci’s stance on the philosophical principles of Marxism 
offers the advantage of immediately reactivating a consonance 
between the Kantian-derived hypotheses upon which we are rely-
ing and their tendency to establish a possible dialogue with the 
contribution of political ecology and the notion of historical nature 
to the contemporary debate on climate change (Moore, 2014). The 
doctrine to which Marx’s heirs must refer, writes Gramsci, must 
not be “neither materialist nor idealistic monism, nor ‘Matter’ nor 
‘Spirit’ evidently, but ‘historical materialism’, that is, human activity 
(history) in concrete terms, that is applied to a certain organized 
‘matter’ (material forces of production), to ‘nature’ transformed by 
man” (Gramsci, 1996, pp. 176-177). A conclusion that would be 
important to acquire in a two-way street: not only is nature mat-
ter organized by man, that is to say “historical nature”, as Jason 
W. Moore would define it, but the matter organized by man can 
be identified with nature, that is considered natural, not so much 
or not only in the sense of organic nature (and this seems to me 
the meaning behind the quotation marks) but in that of a crude 
matter to which, however, still corresponds a specific organization, 
i.e. an internal form. In the second case it is a process that is com-
pletely faithful to the definition of the discipline provided by Marx 
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in the Capital and developed by Michel Foucault while working on 
Discipline and Punish, two contexts in which the work of the forms 
is expressly connected to the dynamics of the subject’s constitu-
tion. In particular – and this is the topic of the fourth chapter – the 
terms in which Foucault poses this problem during the course at 
the Collège de France in 1971 are those of the relationship between 
form and destination, a topic that may prove to be important for 
understanding the transition from Archaeology of Knowledge to 
the adoption of a genealogical perspective that is not limited to 
accepting Nietzsche’s lesson, but is also, probably, influenced by 
the way in which Étienne Balibar is interpreting in those same years 
the theme of the relationship between elements and structure in 
Marx’s work. 
Because even the “theory of transition”, after all, poses the theme 
of the subject that “not to remain something he has become, but 
is in the absolute movement of becoming”, a problem that in the 
more specific field of morphology, had already led to the profound 
revision of the notion of type operated by Goethe in personal 
and enthusiastic agreement with the third Critique. To the last 
three chapters of this volume, one could attribute the ambition of 
extending the gaze of morphology to the social formation pro-
cesses of gender, class and race through the mechanical formative 
power (Bildungskraft) of photographic images. Two orders of clas-
sification and production of subjectivity, which are always united by 
the exorcism of what is changeable, mobile or which is a prelude 
to a combination: two types of living that still today exercise their 
violent grip on the living flesh of the nature that we are.
19
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Expressing his opinion on the debates about the alarming health 
conditions of our planet, Jason W. Moore has consistently proposed 
that we consider the birth of the so called Anthropocene as com-
mencing from the long sixteenth century (1450-1630). After all, it 
was then that as a result of early capitalism a “new mode presumed 
the separation of humans from the rest of nature” had to be created 
(Moore, 2017, p. 8). A separation that wouldn’t be limited to isolat-
ing two already existing elements, but one that needed to establish 
them again as individual concepts, thus, creating a human being 
and a rest of nature which had previously never existed. Moore’s 
hypothesis seems to be validated by a specific focus on the theme 
of metamorphosis, the cosmogonic principle to which Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola associated the nobility and the essence of 
being human (Allen, 1997), questioning whether someone could 
possibly assert the contrary (Quis hunc nostrum chamaeleonta 
non admiretur?: Pico, 2012, p. 7). Less than two centuries later, that 
same principle would be considered so absurd, that it would have 
been out of place even in theatrical performances. I will therefore 
attempt to outline the history of this devaluation, in association 
with the disrepute that at the same time had befallen two other 
cornerstones of classical culture, zoomorphism and spontane-
ous generation, that evidently shared a common adherence to a 
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subject that “not to remain something he has become, but is in the 
absolute movement of becoming”, as written by Marx, where “in 
bourgeois economics – and in the epoch of production to which 
it corresponds – this com plete working-out of the human content 
appears as a complete emptying-out” (Marx, 1973, p. 488).
In this perspective we owe to Pico a second hint about the sublu-
nary sphere as “marked by water, a fluent and mutable substance” 
(Pico, 1996, p. 17), with which one should interpret “every mate-
rial form” (p. 36). On the one hand, in fact, in the environment in 
which the man-chameleon lives, “while the matter is like the bed 
of the sea, there is an indefinite passage of shapes that come and 
go similar to the ebb and flow of the waves”, while on the other 
hand, “as for drops of water happiness consists in pouring them-
selves into the Ocean [...], so our happiness consists in one day 
being able to join that spark of intellectual light which is in us with 
the same primal intelligence” (p. 107; Garin, 2011, pp. 157-161). In 
other words, Pico establishes a close correlation between the ele-
ment of metamorphosis and that of water, of which I would like to 
try understanding and documenting the developments. Because it 
would seem that despite the epoch in which “the beasts are within 
us, right in our entrails, so that we don’t have to go far to transmi-
grate in them” (Pico, 1996, p. 81), is about to set, the sea can equally 
continue roaring, bellowing or showing claws. After all, one of the 
Proto-Indo-European roots that would have remained in the Italian 
word acqua (water), is actually *ap, which would literally mean “that 
which is animated”. And a quick review of the main cosmogonies 
that have alternated throughout history can only confirm the exist-
ence of a privileged link between the sea and the most radical and 
alchemical of all metamorphoses, that of the passage from non-
existence to life. Thus, in the tales of the ancient Egyptians before 
creation the sun god lay on Nun, chaos in the form of a primordial 
ocean. The gods of ancient Babylon were born from the union of 
salt water (tiamat) and freshwater (apsu), while the Hindus believe 
that terrestrial creatures were generated in the sea. The story of 
the Judeo-Christian creation begins with the divine spirit that “hov-
ers over the waters” and from water Allah would have created all 
living beings, according to the Koran (Jha, 2015). In the matter of 
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cosmogonies, then, even the most current findings of astrophysics 
research are no exception, according to these a moment before 
the solar system was formed, the water that is still inside our 
bodies today floated already in empty space. Life itself, that is to say, 
the passage from an inorganic substance to an organic compound 
would be determined within what Charles Darwin, in a famous let-
ter dated February 1 1871 to his botanist friend Joseph Hooker, 
to his botanist friend Joseph Hooker, had defined a “some warm 
little pond”. Once developed by the Russian biochemist Aleksandr 
Ivanovich Oparin, Darwin’s intuition would find confirmation in the 
experiments of Stanley Miller and Harold Urey. Yet there is some-
thing of the ancient relationship between the sea and mutation (it 
was on a strip of beach adluitur autem Aegaeo et Saronico mari that 
the Metamorphoses of Apuleio ended) which conspicuously left the 
scene in the age of biochemists and astrophysics.
To understand this trend, it would not be completely useless to 
recall that the same year in which the second volume of Don Quixote 
is published in Madrid, Galileo writes the most cited of his four 
Copernican letters and Giovan Battista Della Porta dies in Naples. 
The gaze, enchanted by the industriousness of the forms and their 
ability to connect the human being to the rest of nature, would give 
the impression of capitulating to the scrutiny of what “sensible 
experience places before our eyes”, but only to take refuge in the 
imperturbable fixations of a poor mad mind. In this way, the writer 
would then be entrusted with the task of “becoming anyone, even 
the smallest, the most naïve, the most impotent” (Canetti, 1984, pp. 
387-391), that is, to take custody of the same faculty of metamor-
phosis that Galileo is banning everywhere “apart from tides” (Latour, 
2014, p. 3). Seven years earlier, in 1608, Rubens returned from 
Rome with the drawings that would have ensured zoomorphism a 
considerable influence in the history of painting and portraiture, but 
the representation of life that begins to allow itself to be searched 
in the depths of microscopes, programmatically renounces the 
ontological service of similarity. All that of taking shape anticipates 
or can elude the act of observation, is expelled from the universe of 
science to be buried in the discredit of subjective fantasies, where 
for a long time it will continue to exercise clandestinely, even in the 
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perverse ways of racism or misogyny. Yet the waters that with the 
epic of the great discoveries would give the impression of allow-
ing themselves to be objectified by astronomical calculations and 
the on-board instruments appointed to govern them, continue to 
produce phenomena no less extraordinary than the sighting of 
a bull, a monkey or an owl on the face of the Renaissance man. 
Sunken somewhere in the Mediterranean, after all, were the spells 
from which Prospero frees himself at the end of the Tempest, the 
last work entirely written by Shakespeare who from the first act, 
with a language “completely impregnated with alchemical spirit 
and the related idea of  transformation” (Yates, 2001, p. 190) prom-
ises to be a not too isolated case of sea-change (I, 2, 403). And in 
this perspective, while the narration overturns the order of nature 
to make it correspond to the rest not included in the definition of 
human being, it is not entirely correct to argue that magical think-
ing is taking leave from a totally demystified world, but only from a 
temporary regeneration of the world in the no less numinous forms 
of disenchantment. In other words, it seems incorrect to say that 
Ariel, in the play, “not once in the play does Ariel act without spe-
cific order from Prospero” (Bloom, 1998, p. 681), because when 
the news arrives on the island that someone or something has 
incredibly repaired the castaways’ ship, the thesis of Harold Bloom 
is denied by a conversation that places a constitutive limit to the 
sovereignty of new knowledge. “Sir – reveals Ariel in Prospero’s ear 
– all this service have I done since I went”. “My tricksy spirit!”, the 
master then replies (V, 1, 225-227), suggesting that if in this case 
the spirit was able to act on its own initiative and without carrying 
out a precise order, it can continue to do so in the future, once the 
owner has freed it.
A few years have passed since the day when a great expert on that 
same sea, author of the Traicté de la verité des causes et effects, 
des divers cours, mouvements, flux, reflux et saleure de la Mer 
Oceane, Mer Mediterranee et autres Mers de la terre, in a second 
book programmatically titled Histoire admirable des plantes et her-
bes esmerveillables et miraculeuses en nature, determined that if 
the leaves of some trees run out in water they turn into fish (Duret, 
1605, p. 316). Because the sea is the factory of the world and to the 
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aquatic origin (le commencement des eaux) we owe all the answers 
that remove the concreteness of creation from the validation of 
observation (Duret, 1600, pp. 59-60). In the treatise of Claude Duret, 
thus, the adviser of Henry IV to whom these notations are owed, the 
sea is once again the place where the limits of knowledge are set, 
the narrow river mouth of Dante, the incongruity that in the Quaestio 
de aqua et terra forced him to recompose any argumentative 
fracture in a peroration of divine omnipotence (desinant homines 
querere que supra eos sunt). And it is precisely as a boundary, so 
that man will not further press on that the sea will continue to sway 
in Hobbes’s political doctrine, on the scientific blunders of Professor 
Aronnax or in the latest conjectures of Mr Palomar. However, this 
boundary does not cease to maintain a peculiar relationship with 
the idea of  change and the shifting flow of life forms, considering 
that it will be Ishmael to confess in the very first lines of Moby Dick:
Whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; 
whenever it is a damp, drizzly November in my soul; when-
ever I find myself involuntarily pausing before coffin ware-
houses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral I meet; and 
especially whenever my hypos get such an upper hand of 
me, that it requires a strong moral principle to prevent me 
from deliberately stepping into the street, and methodically 
knocking people’s hats off—then, I account it high time to 
get to sea as soon as I can.
But while at the court of Henry IV the fruits of the trees are trans-
formed into fish, amplifying the value of resemblance well beyond 
the limit of proof, in one of the ideal centers of the Copernican rev-
olution, Padua, the waters are ingeniously pumped to the upper 
floors of buildings, where the only one who does not realize that 
times are changing seems to be Don Quixote, the persevering, the 
hero who in those new technologies would certainly not have hes-
itated to apostrophize a dragon or a chimera. Because “his whole 
journey is a quest for similitudes”, to which, the real reason for 
their punctual denial is ironically attributed, when facts take it upon 
themselves to deny them. Indeed, if the pump remains a pump, if it 
does not obey the law of resemblance that would have allowed it to 
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transform itself into a dragon, Don Quixote does not resign himself 
to the sensible experience of experimental reality and in an attempt 
to find the prerequisite of the discrepancy “it is to be found in the 
transformations performed by magicians”. As Michel Foucault 
writes, “all the indices of non-resemblance, all the signs that prove 
that the written texts are not telling the truth, resemble the action 
of sorcery, which introduces difference into the indubitable exist-
ence of similitude by means of deceit” (Foucault, 2002, pp. 52-53). 
If in the age that just ended magic had served to juggle the sympa-
thies of the world, then, now it can only explain in terms of delirium 
why analogies do not have any confirmation, precisely because 
thought ceases to move in the element of resemblance and simili-
tude is no longer the form of knowledge, but the cause of the error. 
When he and Sancho face the famous adventure of the enchanted 
boat, thus, even if the tree to which they tied the animals is no more 
than two reeds away, Don Quixote declares that if he had an astro-
labe, he would not struggle to prove that they are already sailing on 
the open sea. And he adds: 
You don’t know what colures, lines, parallels, zodiac signs, 
ecliptics, poles, solstices, equinoxes, planets, astrological 
signs, points of the compass, and measurements are, of 
which the celestial sphere and the terrestrial sphere are com-
posed. If you knew all these things, or even some of them, 
you would see clearly which parallels we have crossed, or 
which signs of the Zodiac we’ve left behind, and which we’re 
crossing right now (II, 39). 
Don Quixote is crazy, because his boat continues to float near the 
exact point where they found it, that is, on the bank of a river, but 
he who had to resort to a precise lexicon to resign himself to the 
evident truth under his nose, would be no less crazy. And Cervantes 
seems to find an impossible synthesis between the madmen of 
Hyeronimus Bosch, who had embarked on navigation equipped 
only with roasts and mandolins, and the madmen of Narrenschiff, 
among which those who were looking for “joy and indubita-
ble science” in the measurement of anything, are notable. The 
demon of measurement, the unbridled use of compasses that the 
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knight Cesare Ripa will dispense with equal determination to the 
allegorical figures of Mathematics, Judgment, Beauty, Art, 
Economy and Natural Law, would have benefited from the report-
ing of another remarkable coincidence. 
In addition to those of Bosch and Sebastian Brant, in that same 
year of 1494 were, after all, the ships subservient to the new treaty 
of Tordesillas, the town in Castile where the pope’s cosmogra-
phers had proceeded to regulate the possession of a world whose 
actual conformation they ignored still. This way, the waters would 
have once again the task of pushing the Matter, still fertile with 
legal approximations, to a gradual reform, of tilting the border of 
Portuguese domains more and more westward, of fragmenting 
the pre-emptive rights that the initiative of the Pope recognized 
only Spain and Portugal, to crystallize the interests of France, the 
Netherlands and England and to articulate to the cartography of 
Catholic gold, in essence, a supplement of forms not yet contem-
plated, but inherent and effective. At sea, on the sea and close 
to the sea, the raids of pirates and the accelerations of History 
continued to produce more metamorphosis than the demon of 
measure had exorcised, while the new forms between which they 
operated were not revealing themselves less unstable than the 
visions ousted by the cult of evidence. And it is against this insta-
bility, perhaps, to stem the performative power that never ceased 
to be released around wines of Madeira, oriental spices, Brazilian 
woods, Mediterranean wheat, Spanish wool, Dutch ceramics and 
precious stones, that in 1651 the English parliament resolved to 
enact the application of the Navigation Act. Thus, in a futile attempt 
to limit the “catastrophe of local ontologies” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p. 31), 
Shakespeare’s marine metamorphosis (sea-change) risked aban-
doning the scene in search of sea-power (Mollat du Jourdin, 1993). 
From now on, more precisely, to arrange a deal in English ports it 
became necessary that a ship had been built in England and that 
the owner was no less English than the captain and three-quarters 
of his crew. 
It is not surprising then that the sailors of the New Atlantis, start-
ing from 1624, had already equipped themselves to disguise their 
presence among the crew of foreign merchant ships, masking their 
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identity under the name of other nations. And this not for money, the 
governor of the island specified, nor for any other material wealth, 
“but only for God’s first creature, which was Light: to have light (I 
say) of the growth of all parts of the world” (Bacon, 1999, p. 168). 
On the one hand, the dream of knowledge continues to reactivate 
the primordial function of water, which at the beginning of Genesis 
or in the palimpsest of the alchemical opus operate on the perpetual 
redefinition of forms, while on the other the constitution of mod-
ern states and the so-called original accumulation processes 
that inform their provisions – animated by the same amor scel-
eratus habendi which in Ovid’s Metamorphoses had inflated the 
first sails of humanity – seem to develop a kind of Hydrophobia or 
Thalassophobia. More precisely, the sea is still demonized “as the 
sphere of the unreckonable and lawless, in which it is difficult to 
find one’s bearing” and “as a naturally given boundary of the realm 
of human activities” (Blumenberg, 1997, p. 8), but these timeless 
motivations are now declined in the new central role of the oceans 
as a variable to be considered and a border to be crossed in order 
“to mobilize wealth through trade or extraction often accompanied 
by the effort at religious conversion” (Maier, 2016, p. 32). Thus, a 
third internal link to “the metaphorics of seafaring and shipwreck” 
as Hans Blumenberg defines it, comes to full maturity, that is, a link 
relating to the correspondence between the “two elements charac-
terized by liquidity, water and money” (p. 9).
In 1628 Harvey’s studies on the circulatory system were made 
public and when the English parliament resolved to make the naval 
circulation of goods equally systematic, the same year in which 
the Navigation Act came into force, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan 
appears in London bookstores, which would providentially provide 
an anatomical basis for the transfer of the scientific revolution 
into the fabric of political doctrine. However, the “artificial animal” 
which also lent itself to the figuration of new experiments had sud-
denly lost the aquatic nature that was reserved for it by the bibli-
cal source, because on the frontispiece of the book, instead of the 
seas that the monster of Job could have easily reduced to a jar of 
ointments, a terrestrial landscape now appeared. That this replace-
ment was not to be attributed to chance could be confirmed by 
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simply reading the text, in the passage in which Hobbes delves into 
the description of the phenomena of collective madness, which is 
always the product of individual passions that threaten internally, in 
a subtle and viral way, the health of the state. Because, 
as in the midst of the sea, though a man perceives no sound 
of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that 
part contributes as much, to the roaring of the sea, as any 
other part, of the same quantity: so also, though we perceive 
no great unquietness, in one, or two men; yet we may be 
well assured, that their singular passions, are parts of the 
seditious roaring of a troubled nation (Hobbes, 1998, p. 50).
The sound of the sea, in this way, ensures a metaphorical support 
to the disorder that Hobbes could not in any way provide in a unitary 
form, since if the multitude were recognized a possibility of synthe-
sis, if the Leviathan were not generated by agreements which bind 
individual citizens among themselves but the action of a collective 
subject previously defined and therefore underlying the negotiation, 
the sovereign would be involved in a relationship of reciprocity (the 
old domination contract) which would risk inhibiting his powers. In 
other words, the metaphor of the sea disturbs the same doctrinal 
structure that it was intended to exemplify, introducing a connota-
tion, that of the overall noise, which prevents the state from con-
sidering itself as entirely absolute (Stolze, 2019). So, we witness a 
recursive movement comparable to the activity of a ghost: the sea 
that disappeared from the title page reappears a few pages later, 
in a less literal but equally active form, to haunt with its claims the 
consistency of the conceptual apparatus that banned it. 
Canetti writes: 
The Englishman’s disasters have been experienced at sea; 
his dead he has often had to imagine lying at the bottom 
of the sea ; and thus the sea has offered him transforma-
tion and danger. His life at home is complementary to life 
at sea : security and mono tony are its essential character-
istics. Everyone has his place which, except to go to sea, he 
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is not supposed to leave for the sake of any transforma-
tion; everyone is as sure of his habits as of his possessions 
(Canetti, 1978, p. 172).
Perhaps the ghost of the sea would never cease to torment Thomas 
Hobbes, who in his old age would dedicate himself to the transla-
tion of the Iliad and the Odyssey, surely he must have disturbed 
the first scientists of life more than a little. Anticipating them by 
a very few years, Tommaso Campanella had produced a typology 
that was completely comparable to that of Claude Duret, advisor of 
Henry IV who at the beginning of the seventeenth century could still 
attribute the birth of ducks to a metamorphosis of the fruits. 
Campanella writes:
And we see the frogs produce themselves in the dirty, vis-
cous water, which falls into the summer dust and imme-
diately changes its skin and subtle spirit; and I have often 
seen horses’ mane come alive in the hot rain and turn into 
little snakes […]. And I also saw the linen threads and cords, 
in the warm waters, become insects (Campanella, 2007, pp. 
40-41).
Furthermore, Campanella does not limit himself to placing the 
principle of generation ex putri materia at the origin of snakes and 
insects, but extends it to the point of not excluding (negare tamen 
non audeo) that it may also apply to certain forms of human life 
(Carella, 2012). Yet his observations could be defined an echo of 
the time just gone, a sort of survival of reality that the new course is 
hastily archiving in a past of myth and belief. François Jacob wrote 
in the first lines of one of his fortunate articles:
Some of the 16th-century books devoted to zoology are 
illustrated by superb drawings of the various animals that 
populate the earth. Certain contain detailed descriptions of 
such creatures as dogs with fish heads, men with chicken 
legs, or even women with-out heads. The notion of mon-
ster that blend the characteristics of different species is not 
itself surprising: everyone has imagined or sketched such 
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hybrids. What is disconcenting today is that in the 16th 
century these creatures belonged, not to the world of fanta-
sies, but to the real world. Many people had seen them and 
described them in detail. The monsters walked alongside 
the familiar animals or everyday life. They were within the 
limits of the possible (Jacob, 1977, p. 1161).
Thus, in 1636, when Campanella republished his observations in a 
Latin translation, confirming his full confidence in his own witnesses 
(ranae, anguiculi, animalia insecta) and the consequent reiteration 
of “un écart morphologique”, a misunderstanding of the species, 
a monstrous phenomenon because it is contrary to the growing 
need to see that “the same engender the same”, it really seems that 
“the moment has come when rational thought would triumph over 
monstrosity, just as the imagination had taken pleasure in believ-
ing that heroes and saints could triumph over monsters”. If in the 
teratology of the Renaissance the animal forms still play a game 
of “exchanging their organs and varying the combinations of these 
organs”, in fact, “in the age of experiments, the mon ster is taken to 
be a symptom of puerility or mental malady; it indicates debility or 
a breakdown of reason” (Canguilhem, 2008, pp. 134-140). Thus, in 
the third meditation Descartes will relegate all phenomena similar 
to those observed by Campanella to the sphere of Factitious Ideas, 
that is, images manufactured by reason that have no correspond-
ence in the extended world.
In 1668 Francesco Redi ascertained that it was not the mysterious 
transformations of a decaying matter that generated the worms 
in the cavities of a carcass, but the flies that had laid their eggs 
there. The identical generates the identical, thus, definitively retir-
ing the natural philosophy handed down by the fourth book of the 
Georgics, where the story is introduced by an apparition of Proteus 
that emerges from the waters (e fluctibus antra ibat) who then turns 
into every possible oddity (omnia transformat sese in miracula 
rerum). Yet Proteus will have to resign himself to informing Aristeo 
of the reasons that caused the slaughter of his bees: it is precisely 
by fleeing from Aristeo that Eurydice was killed by a serpent and 
it is therefore a retaliation of Orpheus and the nymphs that now 
the fate that now befalls the beekeeper. It will therefore be Cyrene 
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who will interpret Proteus’s story to show Aristeo how to proceed: 
sacrificing four bulls and four heifers to the nymphs, abandoning 
their carcasses in the woods and then returning to verify what 
would happen nine days later. Aristeo follows his mother’s instruc-
tions and at dawn on the ninth day, when he returns to the woods, 
he discovers that 
Hic vero subitum ac dictu mirabile monstrum 
Aspiciunt, liquefacta bovom per viscera toto 
Stridere apes utero et ruptis effervere costis 
Immensasque trahi nubes iamque arbore summa 
Confluere et lentis uvam demittere ramis (IV, 555-558). 
It is true that it is a prodigy (monstrum), but it is also the very way in 
which bees are born. The point is that once placed in an airtight con-
tainer, Redi will say, carrion does not generate anything anymore. 
And it is in this same perspective, therefore, so that it is always the 
same to generate the same, that even the man of the seventeenth 
century is preformed, miniaturized and boxed in a vitelline mem-
brane, inside which the development of the foetus must consist 
in the maturation of a form already given. The enchanted world of 
Tommaso Campanella and Claude Duret, then, turns upside down 
in Malebranche’s philosophy, which marks the immutable order of 
res extensa with the seal of divine creation, so much so that “the 
females of the original animals may have been created along with 
all those of the same species that they have begotten and that are 
to be begotten in the future” (Malebranche, 1997, p. 27; Pyle, 2006). 
The century therefore does not hesitate to reveal how every man 
had already been enclosed in the bodies of Adam or Eve (experi-
menta nostra patent cum quicquid est hominum in lumbis Adami 
et Evae occlusum fuerit: Swammerdam, 1685, p. 54) or it more 
cautiously limits itself to suspecting (l’on peut supposer) that every 
animal observed under the microscope may contain an animal of 
the same seed (Hartsoeker, 1674, pp. 221-244). Metamorphosis 
is nothing but a veneer (se transforment à nôtre veuë) because as 
soon as their size allows it, for example, insects free themselves 
from the membrane that made them look like worms and appear 
for what they have always been. The one preformed into the other, 
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thus, the petit animal that scientists presume or expect to meet 
during their inspections look more and more like the homunculi 
that the impious and parabalani Paracelsus hoped to spot in the 
flasks of the alchemists (Redi, 1996, p. 90), but their shape will have 
been protected from any hypothesis of irrigation, from the won-
ders of steam and from the mother of all navigations, that in the 
amniotic fluid. 
In the meantime, the idea of  metamorphosis had become so 
absurd and incredible as to be improper even in theatre. So much 
so that in order to save Iphigenia it will be necessary to invent an 
alternative solution to the one that perhaps could have enthused 
Euripides’ audience (une métamorphose qui pouvait bien trouver 
quelque créance du temps d’Euripide), but one which would have 
now caused annoyance and dissatisfaction (Racine, J., 2009, 
p. 1083). Racine’s theorem would seem to be confirmed by the 
precedent of Jean Rotrou, who in 1640 had thought of replacing 
Euripides’ alleged metamorphosis with an apotheosis, but as his 
Agamemnon emphasised (ô rare avanture, ô miracle inouy) this 
new solution did not differ so much from the expedients which 
Racine will accuse of obsolescence (Rotrou, 1641, V, 3). But it will be 
opportune to remember that in Euripides’ tragedy no metamorpho-
sis actually took place, since Iphigenia was explicitly replaced by 
– and not changed into – a doe. Therefore, philology is on the side 
of painters, who from the time of Timante to Giambattista Tiepolo, 
passing through Jan Steen (1671) and from the fresco painted 
in Versailles by Charles de La Fosse (1680) have never stopped 
depicting the doe on the same scene where the sacrifice is about 
to be made, that is, in lieu of Iphigenia. Yet, when Racine’s youngest 
son proposes to compare Euripides’ tragedy with the work of his 
father, whose reasons he is determined to support (on ne puvait 
sur notre théâtre sauver Iphygénie par la voie d’un miracle si peu 
vraisemblable pour nous), he attributes the miraculous ending of 
Rotrou to the Greek text, also erasing any trace of blood from the 
classical palimpsest (Racine, L., 1843, pp. XXVIII-XIX). Because it 
seems that blood is the real stake: the animal blood of the ancients, 
the blood providentially spared by Rotrou and the impure blood 
of the solution finally adopted by Racine. Who, as is well known, 
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uses an extraordinary case of homonymy: Erifile is Elena’s secret 
daughter, in reality her name is the same as her cousin, Ifigenia, 
and her evil nature makes her a much more adequate victim to the 
vraisemblance. The representation must appear plausible, but this 
likelihood – as underlined by the controversy aroused in France 
by the success of Cid, when Corneille found himself having to 
defend a tragicomedy substantially guilty of having ennobled the 
enemy Spanish, but otherwise accused of formal inconsistency – 
finds its profound and less negotiable motivations in a viscerally 
political dimension. Therefore, even in Racine’s drama Iphigenia 
is constantly surrounded by an element quite comparable to the 
multitude of Hobbes, the crowd that demands her blood moves 
in waves (flots tumultueux: V, 2) and a flood of enemies is ready to 
swallow her (les flots d’ennemis prêts à l’envelopper: V, 3). However, 
when her namesake will replace her on the altar of war, the one 
who wished to see Iphigenia dead and who will personally procure 
her own death, it will no longer be the killing of an innocent virgin to 
restore order and stability to things, but the sudden shift of sacrifice 
into the paradigm of just punishment. For this kind of expedients, 
referring to some rites such as the Athenian Bufonias where the 
participants absolved themselves of the responsibility of the kill-
ing by attributing the blame to a single individual and pursued the 
objective of obtaining the consent of the victim, classical philolo-
gists have appealed to the genre of Unschuldkomödie, the comedy 
of innocence. An innocence clearly granted to Racine’s community, 
who by sacrificing a woman who is nevertheless guilty (qui mérite 
en quelque façon d’être punie) tends to distance itself from the 
bloody crowd that only later, when the body was already lying on 
the ground, realized that they had not killed a virgin but a doe. Three 
years later, Racine will entrust the ending of Phaedra to the word 
pureté and it is precisely the search for this purity, it seems, that 
allows the sleeping sea to resume bellowing (la mer leur répond 
par ses mugissements), which while continuing to render miracu-
lous the departure of the Greek fleet (quel miracle, Clytemnestra 
exclaims) made it unthinkable to have resorted in 1674 to such 
a timely replacement that could be confused with the miracle of 
metamorphosis. Just as the numerous performances of Iphigenia, 
are staged in the city, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz is staying at 
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the Hotel des Romains in Faubourg St. Germain. He had arrived 
in Paris two years earlier to persuade Louis XIV to wage a Holy 
War against Egypt and he regularly frequented its theatres (Stewart 
2005). And it is precisely in a theatre, that he may have heard for the 
first time the same marine bellow to which many years later he will 
associate one of the most famous examples of the passage to the 
consciousness of the still unreflected forms of perception. Then, to 
catch the sound of the sea,
we must hear the parts which make up this whole [ce 
mugissement même], that is the noise of each wave, 
although each of these little noises makes itself known only 
when combined confusedly with all the others, and would 
not be noticed if the wave which made it were by itself. We 
must be affected slightly by the motion of this wave, and 
have some perception of each of these noises, however 
faint they may be; otherwise there would be no perception 
of a hundred thousand waves, since a hundred thousand 
nothings cannot make something (Leibniz, 1982, p. 47).
As is well known, Leibniz’s man perceives many more things than 
he believes he perceives and what “sensible experience places 
before our eyes”, therefore, the experimental and sensitive datum 
that ministers of method must concern themselves with, arises 
from a background of changes (des changements dans l’âme 
même) which do not always translate into the acquisition of evi-
dence. Nevertheless, if it were possible to unfold the interiority of 
the monad, we would find the entire universe there, since there 
being no leaps in nature, “the communication between things is 
able to extend to any distance” of time and space, so that “God 
can read in the individual body what happens everywhere, what has 
already happened and what will happen” (Leibniz, 2001, p. 87). The 
intellect must therefore delve into the knowledge of the relation-
ship that unites causes to effects, but “if we meant literally that 
things of which we are unaware exist neither in the soul nor in the 
body, then we would fail in philosophy as in politics, because we 
would be neglecting to mikron, imperceptible changes [les progrès 
insensibles]” (Leibniz, 1982, p. 49). This progress, appropriately 
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exemplified by the noise of the single waves, creates a sudden anal-
ogy between the sea of  Leibniz and that, undoubtedly darker and 
regressive but still mobile, of Thomas Hobbes. The aforementioned 
analogy seems to be confirmed by the words that Gilles Deleuze 
will use to paraphrase the paragraph in which Leibniz wrote: “To 
give a clearer idea of these minute perceptions which we are una-
ble to pick out from the crowd, I like to use the example of the roar-
ing noise [du mugissement] of the sea which impresses itself on 
us when we are standing on the shore” (Leibniz, 1982, p. 46). With 
the expression “from the crowd”, the Italian translator Emilio Cecchi 
renders it in French as dans la foule, to which publishers often add 
the specification des perceptions. On the contrary, for Deleuze it will 
be a question of “apprehend the sound of the sea, or of an assem-
bly of people, but not the murmur of each wave or person who 
nonetheless is part of each whole” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 87). In other 
occurrences of this example, which Leibniz confessed to habitually 
resorting (j’ai coutume de me servir de l’exemple du mugissement 
ou du bruit de la mer), for the assembly of people of Deleuze not 
even the slightest margin of eventuality produced by the passage 
in question is created, but the association between the subliminal 
wave of progress and the no less subliminal wave of regression to 
the state of nature still appears possible. In any case, what Leibniz 
wants to establish is the way in which the wholeness of the world 
has always been preformed within the monad and thus, in the 
Discourse on Metaphysics, whoever approaches the shore (ceux 
qui s’approchent du rivage de la mer) experiences the confused 
perception of a totality otherwise enclosed in the folds of the soul 
(Leibniz, 2020, p. 40), which emerges to consciousness through the 
progressive deepening of an interior experience. Because the soul, 
we read about this in the Principles of Nature and Grace, knows 
the infinite but in a confused manner, “as when walking along the 
seashore and hearing the great noise it makes, we indeed hear the 
particular noises made by each wave of which the whole noise is 
composed, but without distinguishing them” (Leibniz, 2001, p. 51). 
To every effort of distinction, then, corresponds a further corollary 
of contingencies as of yet unknown and it is therefore necessary 
that the final reason for these shifts remain foreign to their infinite 
concatenation: it will therefore be by divine regulation that the 
Pierpaolo Ascari
38
content of the soul can correspond to the content of the world, as 
if it truly passed from one to the other, where the origin of each 
form (origo formarum) is relative to the knowledge of what the 
monad already contained. Therefore, in this sense, having reduced 
any transformation to the unfolding of a preordained interior-
ity (Becchi, 2017), when Leibniz argues that the soul is immortal 
and that it can only pass through continuous metamorphosis, the 
strange forms that at the end of the Tempest would have survived 
the magic (strange Shapes: III, 3, 15-20) are taken over by a rea-
son that conjugates them to the anterior future, because the soul 
too, can only unfold in the forms predetermined by the purpose 
that the creator will have infused into it (divinae praeformationi 
debetur: Leibniz, 2016).
Meanwhile, the seas that roared in the Tempest (to cry to th’ sea 
that roar’d to us: I, 2, 149), the animal bladder of Duret and the seas 
that continue to bellow still in Leibniz’s New essays on Human 
Understanding or in Racine’s Iphigenia, find a passionate defender 
in the Principal Painter in Ordinary. In fact, with his theory on expres-
sion, which relies on the natural similarity between the elements of 
creation, Charles Le Brun does not limit himself to postulating a 
correspondence between the face of a human and that of animals, 
the same correspondence that in 1773 will be further confirmed 
by the French translation of the alleged Rubens’ Roman sketch-
books by the bookseller Jombert (l’homme composé des élémens 
de l’univers, partecipe de tous les animaux: Rubens, 1773, p. 11), 
but Le Brun extends the application of universal sympathies to the 
correct representation of landscapes (elle doit encore être dans la 
representation des païsages: Le Brun, 1698, p. 3). He himself must 
have known very well the two globes that Louis XIV had commis-
sioned at the beginning of the 1980s to the Venetian friar Vincenzo 
Coronelli and which at first should have been placed in the Galerie 
des Glaces, and would then be installed at the castle of Marly, two 
locations both under Le Brun’s supervision, who, in addition, had 
designed them. And it is thus interesting to note how Coronelli him-
self, in his globes, did not fail to associate an extraordinary appa-
ratus of zoomorphic figures and descriptive notes to the precise 
arrangement of the lands and seas, recreating a strong interaction 
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between the forms of nature and the forms in which the peculi-
arities of human beings were expressed. The textual parts would 
have intensified at the poles, of course, where the narrative had to 
compensate for the lack of sufficiently reliable maps, but the whole 
earth’s surface was episodically populated by sea monsters, storks 
and cetaceans. To evaluate the meaning of these representations 
one should look to the interpretation of another globe, preserved in 
Venice, which Coronelli builds upon his return from Paris. Here, in 
the south of Madagascar, right in the middle of the Indian Ocean, 
where the most recent testimonies of the Jesuit fathers do not 
agree with the maps in his possession, the friar specifies that “such 
observations, as they would upset the whole geography if put into 
practice, deserve further consideration first” (Catalogo dei globi, 
1960, p. 28). Oceans and coasts, in other words, can provisionally 
take the form of all the animals necessary for the completion of 
their sensible experience.
The still partial conclusions of this account could be entrusted to 
a photograph from 1910 which portrays Debussy in the company 
of Stravinsky. Behind them, in Debussy’s studio, is framed a copy 
of the Great Wave off Kanagawa which five years earlier, partially 
altered, had appeared on the covers of the first printed edition of 
La Mer. The sea that had repeatedly roared and bellowed in the first 
centuries of the so-called Anthropocene, therefore, the sea that at 
the end of Poe’s Manuscript found in a bottle is even afforded four 
mouths, now it unsheathes countless claws. He does or contin-
ues to do so within the field of figuration and metaphor, of course, 
obeying a more comprehensive reorganization of knowledge and 
assigning to what Galileo had defined pure narration the task to pre-
serve a weakened image of myth and magic. The proliferation of 
metamorphoses in Baroque art, in this perspective, would actually 
seem to coincide with their disablement, precisely because they 
are reduced exclusively to figures, that is to a leap that is no longer 
determined in the reality of daily life, as it had happened in the 16th 
century as described by François Jacob, but only in fantasy (Kibédi 
Varga, 1980, pp. 4-6). If the Don Quixote can be considered the first 
modern literary work, Foucault argues, it is precisely because 
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in it we see the cruel reason of identities and differences 
make endless sport of signs and similitudes; because in it 
language breaks off its old kinship with things and enters 
into that lonely sovereignty from which it will reappear, in 
its separated state, only as literature; because it marks the 
point where resemblance enters an age which is, from the 
point of view of resemblance, one of madness and imagina-
tion (Foucault, 2002, p. 54). 
Yet, as it happens in the sea of  Hobbes, the metaphor and the 
similarity seem to undermine the coherence of the order of the 
discourse itself, which has confined them to pure narration, tak-
ing revenge similar to that of homunculi who once escaped from 
the alchemists’ flasks in which Francesco Redi presumed to have 
caged them, reappear at the end of microscopes. In the meantime, 
Racine’s exorcisms against a phantasmic metamorphosis will give 
this same movement of disappearance and reappearance the crys-
talline form of the return of the repressed. Finally, with Leibniz, the 
continuous metamorphosis of the monad will be ensured for the 
protection of a final reason that has always preformed them. The 
persistence of metamorphosis, in other words, this partial failure 
of reason in the anthropological effort to separate the human being 
from the rest of nature, ends up corroborating Walter Benjamin’s 
thesis according to which the Baroque would have been no less 
devoted to magic then the Renaissance, because “[w]hatever it 
picks up, its Midas-touch turns into something endowed with signif-
icance. Its element was transformation of every sort; and allegory 
was its scheme” (Benjamin, 1998, p. 229). Before an epistemolog-
ical dignity is returned to zoomorphism, however, it will be neces-
sary to wait for the time of Johann Kaspar Lavater, with whom the 
human being actually reverts to brazenly compromising itself with 
the rest of nature but in a chapter of Physiognomy entirely written 
by Goethe.
To conclude, then, Goethe deserves a last digression, a brief refer-
ence to the story of the gentleman from Antwerp who, on his return 
from a long journey, rushed into the workshop of a painter friend 
to tell him what he had seen in a particular village in the Ardennes. 
The painter had not even deigned to greet him, it is said, as if 
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nothing could distract him from the painting he was undertaking, 
but when the gentleman had approached the easel he had discov-
ered that the landscape reproduced with such concentration by his 
friend was precisely the one evoked in his story. After all, Gombrich 
writes, the gentleman was an old friend of the painter, he used to 
regularly visit his house and upon returning from his trip he had 
gone to him with the sole purpose of telling him about the pictur-
esque images he had seen. So it was perhaps the familiarity he had 
with the painter’s work, we may add, to tune his spirit with what he 
had seen during the trip (Gombrich, 1966, p. 116). When she writes 
about the same anecdote, on the contrary, Svetlana Alpers seems 
animated by the need to rehabilitate not so much or not only the 
primacy of perception, but the idea of  a spiritual harmony between 
the gentleman and the painter that recognizes a descriptive purity 
of perception. In doing this, however, she does not hesitate to 
rearticulate the plot and to attribute to the individual characters 
a more rational behaviour. Now the gentleman who had seen the 
Ardennes will invite his painter friend to visit him and it is only after 
listening to the beginning of his story that the artist will get to work 
(Alpers, 1983, p. 147). In reality, Alpers’ version is a manipulation, 
because in the original text things go exactly as Gombrich claims 
(a Gentlemen comes to visit his old friend, an ingegnous Painter of 
that Citie: Norgate, 1997, p. 83) but that does not mean that her 
intervention is not worthwhile. On the one hand it has the advan-
tage of attenuating the postmodern propensity to debase any form 
of experience in writing that precedes it and determines it, on the 
other it risks associating the perceptual sphere with the exercise 
of an intention that is exaggeratedly present to itself. In this sense, 
when she says that some views of the seventeenth century adhere 
to a desire to inform that does not necessarily imply the latency of 
a formal model, her hypothesis is certainly appropriate for the pur-
pose of differentiating the individual poetic and pictorial traditions, 
but it remains less plausible in terms of aesthetic reflection. Indeed, 
precisely because a Dutch merchant wishes to see a depiction of 
himself and of his house (Alpers, 1983, p. 151), it is necessary that 
“the look of a good life” be consumed in the forms pre-arranged 
by a representation, albeit cartographic, but which will not fail to 
influence the figurative organization of the same reality designated 
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to show itself. In other words, not only does the cartography of 
comfort obey a specific narrative purpose, because the elements 
of figuration will still have to illustrate how things are, but it will have 
exercised a preliminary influence on everyday life. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to derive from Alpers’ alterations 
an argument in favour of Gombrich’s conclusions, which are badly 
supported by the proverbial “case of Aretino who discovers the 
beauty of Venetian sunsets through Titian’s colour” (Gombrich, 
1966, p. 117). That anecdote, refers to a letter of 1544 in which 
Aretino spoke clearly of a sky that “never was embellished with such 
hazy paint”, of buildings that “seemed made of artificial matter” and 
of the air separated from the palaces “with the way that Vecellio 
sets it apart”, but the merits of this enterprise were explicitly attrib-
uted to “Nature, master of the masters” and the ending of the letter, 
consequently, expressed the nostalgia for a landscape that only 
Titian could have fixed on the canvas (Aretino, 2008, pp. 15-16). 
On closer inspection, painting had certainly revealed itself to be a 
prefiguration of reality, but of a reality that did not render knowledge 
pleonastic and which, if anything, intensified it, representing one of 
those “conditions under which phenomena appear” that would later 
constitute, according to Goethe, the specific and qualifying object 
of morphology. Which, as is well known, has a peculiar relationship 
with the central pages of Italian Journey, which end with an appeal 
to Herder’s judgement that even the gentleman of Antwerp could 
have addressed to his painter friend (“And when I get home, you 
shall judge for yourselves how well I have used my eyes”: Goethe, 
1982, p. 304)
A few hours earlier, on May 16, 1787, Goethe was on the ship that 
brought him back from Sicily to the Gulf of Naples in the company 
of the landscape painter Christoph Heinrich Kniep and he wrote: 
Everybody was glum and impatient, except Kniep and 
myself. Looking at the world with the eyes of painters [mit 
malerischen Augen], we were perfectly content to enjoy the 
sunset, which was the most magnificent spectacle we had 
seen during the whole voyage. Cape Minerva and its adjoin-
ing ranges lay before us in a display of brilliant colours. The 
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cliffs stretching to the south had already taken on a bluish 
tint. From the Cape to Sorrento the whole coast was lit up. 
Above Vesuvius towered an enormous smoke cloud, from 
which a long streak trailed away to the east, suggesting that 
a violent eruption was in progress. Capri rose abruptly on 
our left and, through the haze, we could see the outlines of 
its precipices. The wind had dropped completely, and the 
glittering sea, showing scarcely a ripple, lay before us like a 
limpid pond under the cloudless sky (p. 299).
And it was precisely on that journey to Sicily, taking on a landscape 
painter’s gaze (als Landschaftszeichner), that Goethe had declared 
that he had finally been able to understand the vaporous transpar-
ency (die dunstige Klarheit) of Claude Lorrain’s paintings, estab-
lishing a circular, and no longer causal, relationship between the 
mastery of Nature and the mastery of painting that now allowed 
him to extend his understanding of Lorrain’s work beyond those 
same vapours (durch den durchsichtigen Dunst) to guess at the 
profile of a cliff. Thus, the “all-encircling sea with its ever-changing 
colours and moods” (p. 305), that is to say in the only situation in 
which a man can really “have a true conception of the world and 
of his own relation to it” (p. 220), the “feeling of a secret intimacy 
between the expectation of the eye and the extension contem-
plated by it” was created (Besse, 2008, p. 56), which also restores 
an animal interiority to the landscape. 
But this correspondence – by virtue of which “man knows himself 
only to the extent that he knows the world, of which he is aware 
only in himself, as he is aware of himself only in it” – implies adher-
ence to a form of chameleon-like knowledge based on the assump-
tion that “every new object, if observed well, opens up a new organ 
in us” (Goethe, 1983a, p. 146). Each experiment, therefore, must 
place the eye in front of itself and its own metamorphoses, because 
“pretending to adhere to the individuality of the phenomenon and 
observe it, measure it, weigh it is like pretending to drink the sea” 
(Goethe, 1983b, p. 135). And it is precisely in this pre scientific 
and Renaissant sea, where one could actually “study the motions 




aesthetic experience proposes to overcome the limit inscribed in 
the marine drafted by Hobbes and Leibniz. 
This possibility is revealed by the gaze that transcends the iron con-
trast between “sensible experience” and “pure narration”, in a mor-
phological perspective to which Goethe will not fail to ensure the 
comfort of his first encounter with Kantian aesthetics. To be exact, 
it is 1817 when he writes:
I came upon the Critique of the power of judgment and I 
am indebted to it for a truly happy period of my existence. 
In it I saw exposed side by side the most diverse subjects 
of my labours, products of Art and Nature addressed one 
the same as the other, aesthetic judgement and teleologi-
cal judgement highlighting each other. Although it was not 
always possible for me to match my way of seeing with 
that of the author and, here and there, something seemed 
to escape me, the great master ideas of that work were per-
fectly analogous to what I had created, done and thought 
up until then; the internal life of both Art and Nature, their 
mutual action and reaction, were clearly discussed in that 
book. The products of these two unlimited worlds had to 
exist for themselves, and what coexisted existed indeed for 
the other, but not expressly because of the other (Goethe, 
1983c, p. 138). 
The definition of teleological judgement, in fact, could provide him 
with a conception of changes extraneous to any objective determi-
nation, which was undoubtedly susceptible to perspective coher-
ence but only “in analogy with causality according to ends” (Kant, 
§61, 2000, p. 234). One can study the structure of a bird in two ways, 
Kant had suggested: it can be considered in relation to a nexus fina-
lis, or it can be established that nature “could have formed itself in 
a thousand different ways” and that its conformity to a purpose 
therefore restores the changing reconfigurations of a nexus effecti-
vus. Even the morphological characteristics of birds (the lightness 
of the bones, the arrangement of the wings and the similarity of the 
tail to a rudder) are not seemingly caused by the purpose of flight, 
but imply the need to fly “as if it were to be found in nature” (als ob 
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er in der Natur befindlich wäre). If in eye of Preformationism the art 
of representing objects arranged on a single plane at a different 
distance essentially consisted of a deception (consiste principale-
ment à tromper la Vûë: Hartsoeker, 1712, p. 42), now it is only the 
insertion of Nature in an analogical perspective (als ob, as if) to 
allow it to be observed correctly. The artist, who did not fail to pro-
fess his implacable aversion to final causes (Goethe, 1983c, p. 
138), will therefore be able to claim the cognitive value of his own 
experience of the world. 
Yet, despite Kant’s aesthetics being able to represent for Goethe the 
entire philosophical corpus that needs a spirit that “had no desire to 
lay bare the secret of life” (Cassirer, 1963, p. 77), it should be noted 
that it is precisely the third Critique that promotes a representation 
of the sea simply opposite to that of Italian Journey. The human 
being who only on the high seas could “have a true conception of 
the world and of his own relation to it” in fact, in the Critique of the 
power of judgment looks at “the wide ocean, enraged by storms” 
from a shore partially adjacent to that of Leibniz and derives from 
it its feeling of alienation from the rest of nature (Kant, §23, 2000, p. 
129). Thus, the Ardennes observed from an artist’s shop in Antwerp, 
not before Aretino had contemplated Venice’s lagoon from a win-
dow in Ca’ Bollani, will be echoed by the many shipwrecks quand on 
est au rivage that allow the Romantic genius to experience the nos-
talgia of the infinite. Therefore the sea can be imagined from the 
top of a hill, but giving life to a series of suggestions that will essen-
tially lack two things, “variety and belonging and being close to our 
daily life” (Leopardi, 1991, I, p. 1051). Or it will be the sea observed 
from the cliffs of Rügen, where it is said that David Caspar Friedrich 
used to climb on stormy days and exclaim: “How big, mighty, won-
derful all this!”. But there will always be something in this sublime 
spectacle that nullifies the potential expressed by the encounter 
between morphology and teleological judgement and their intoler-
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In an attempt to describe the break that would have character-
ized the passage to the seventeenth century, I have previously 
employed a phrase by Bruno Latour on which it is now appropriate 
to linger. In the perspective we have outlined, it would seem that 
the hybrids that according to François Jacob populated the earth 
in the sixteenth century, would be the ones to claim their rights 
through Latour’s reflection. Yet, it could be Latour himself to pro-
vide an interpretation of the notion of form that risks compromis-
ing the same enterprise it intends to complete. A commendable 
enterprise, which on the page with which I would like to begin, was 
formulated in these terms:
In order to portray the first new Earth as one falling body 
among all the other falling bodies of the universe, Galileo 
had to put aside all notions of climate, agitation, and met-
amorphosis (apart from tides); to discover the second new 
Earth, climatologists are bringing the climate back in and 
returning the Earth to its sublunar, corrupted, and agitated 
condition. [...] Even though we have to continue fighting 
those who are in denial, I propose that we let them alone for 
a moment and seize this opportunity to advance our com-
mon cosmopolitics. What I want to explore in this paper 
is what sort of agency this new Earth should be granted 
(Latour, 2014, pp. 3-4).
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This enterprise is consistent with the programme that Latour had 
already explained in the opening lines of his famous conversation 
with François Ewald, when he did not hesitate to declare that the 
concept of symmetrical anthropology remained to all intents and 
purposes a project of political philosophy (Latour, 2008, p. 12). After 
all, the idea of  employing for scientific experimentation the same 
attitude with which ethnography had approached the truths of oth-
ers, had struck him at the time of his appointment at the Office 
de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer of Abidjan, in 
the Ivory Coast, that is to say in an environment which, albeit in a 
broad sense, can be defined as post-colonial (Schmidgen, 2015, 
pp. 20-24). Around the world, Latour explained, the West would 
have been regularly surprised by the stubbornness with which 
other populations continued to confuse facts and moral values, in 
a “hallucinatory mixture of conceptions of the cosmos and con-
ceptions of social life” indifferent to the suspicion that the same 
hallucination had always influenced his relationship with nature 
and with science. Better yet, that relationship was more properly 
arming him, because it arose from the fact-value of considering 
oneself as custodians of an appropriate separation between scien-
tific truth and the necessary conditions for its historical and subjec-
tive existence, the supposed universalism for which “modern men 
were never bad: they did indeed go to war, but always for a peda-
gogical purpose, since they limited themselves to teaching each 
other the evidence of a shared world, which was that of nature and 
technology” (Latour, 2008, p. 15). 
Already in the concluding lines of We have never been modern, to 
the work of abstraction or “purification” of the supposed facts that 
have altered the vision and demonized the initiatives, the modern 
and positivist “we” to which Latour often tends to attribute a ques-
tionable coherence, must contrast a theoretical posture that is 
finally on par with the political contingency: “If we do not change the 
common dwelling – he writes – we shall not absorb in it the other 
cultures that we can no longer dominate, and we shall be forever 
incapable of accommodating in it the environment that we can no 
longer control” (Latour, 1993, p. 145). The problem, wrote Razmig 
Keucheyan, is that despite the appeals and “although it is exhibited in 
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works that have titles like Politiques de la nature o Les atmosphères 
de la politique, or in journals such as Cosmopolitiques”, Latour’s 
remains “a theory that is ultimately barely political”, because “the 
‘pragmatic’ epistemology from which most of these works derive is 
not able to capture the systemic and conflictual nature of environ-
mental inequalities” (Keucheyan, 2014, p. 48). Therefore, to the list 
of what Keucheyan must obviously regard as misleading titles, we 
must also add Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, 
a book that in the perspective I am trying to outline has, however, 
the merit of positioning itself in a more explicit manner in the field 
of post-colonial reflection, to which Latour declares he wants to 
attribute an “unexpected” meaning (Latour, 2018, p. 7). In line with 
the conclusions of We have never been modern, where the problem 
was that of a subject finally unable to confirm its dominion over 
“other cultures” and the environment, now it is as though Europe 
“had made a centennial pact with the potential migrants: we went 
to your lands without asking your permission; you will come to ours 
without asking”. Or rather, a dual pact with the great-grandchildren 
of the colonized and “other terrestrials, who are also setting out to 
invade its borders: the water of the seas, dried-up or overflowing 
rivers, forests obliged to migrate as fast as possible so as not to 
be overtaken by climate change, microbes and parasites, all these, 
too, aspire to a great replacement” (p. 91). 
More than a barely political theory, after the emergence to the 
surface of the text of phenomena such as the invasion or the rep-
resentation of cultures as coherent, homogeneous subjectivities, 
linked only by a relationship of juxtaposition or of reciprocal sub-
stitution (modern and terrestrial, European and migrant, the “we” 
to which I have already referred and its substantial indifference to 
the “systemic and conflictual character of inequalities”), Latour’s 
politics could be defined as not very reflective, because they tend 
to reify in his proposal the same separation between facts and val-
ues  that he had denounced in an analytic context, postulating the 
existence of cultures newly “purified” of their multiple and explosive 
social hybridizations. Moreover, in this way, the effectively colonial 
paradigm of juxtaposition and substitution – which does not lack 
porosity and grey areas, for example in Frantz Fanon’s reflection 
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– is extended to the limits of the present, where the post-colonial 
condition encounters the truly “unexpected” obligation of having to 
match a robotic consequence, an automatic reflex, a compulsion 
to repeat the outcomes of colonization. Thus, precisely in terms of 
Down to Earth, one could direct the same objection that he makes 
to the “grandiose Galilean invention”, to Latour, namely that not only 
the earth, but also the social forms once observed by Sirius remain 
“only a tiny part […] of what we have the right to know positively” 
(p. 64). According to Latour, in fact, a more specific observation 
of this dimension would entail the restoration of a “pure form”, the 
social, which, also through the mediations of dialectic thought, 
would entail the denial of hybrids or their illusory, “modern” identi-
fication with a mixture of equally pure forms (Latour, 1993, p. 78). 
And here is how modernity ends up carrying out a function similar 
to that which in the perspective of the Anthropocene is conferred 
on the species (Manghi, 2018), a geological agent so undifferenti-
ated as to cause the dual movement with which “climate change 
is denaturalised in one moment, relocated from the sphere of nat-
ural causes to that of human activities, only to be renaturalised 
in the next, when derived from an innate human trait, such as the 
ability to control fire” (Malm, Hornborg, 2014, p. 4). A control over 
fire that can easily represent, in metaphor, the use of coal in the 
furnaces of the industrial revolution or the first test of the pluto-
nium bomb, the two events that in the official narrative compete 
to mark the start of the new era. In any case, Malm and Hornborg 
argue, the whole process would confirm the capitalist tendency 
of social relations to appear as natural properties of things (p. 
6), proving the validity of the analyses conducted by Marx in the 
pages on The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret, the very 
same which Latour uses to elaborate his definition of faitiche. 
Latour then writes: 
Under the now-dispelled fantasy of the fetish, the enlight-
ened human being realizes that he is not really alone, but 
that he shares his existence with a crowd of actors. The 
alien he thought he was eliminating comes back in the 
frightfully complicated form of social multitude. The human 
actor has merely exchanged one form of transcendence for 
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another. […] Marx, in his famous definition of the fetishism of 
commodities, illustrates how something that does nothing 
can still manage to proliferate (Latour, 2010, p. 10). 
Thus, what the analysis of fetishism would involuntarily make bla-
tant, is how much Marx himself considered it a mistake to transfer 
the origin of actions from the subject to the object, as if there really 
could be “a deanimated world of mere stuff” (Latour, 2014, p. 7) 
and preliminary to the incorporation of the value. That of fetishism, 
therefore, would turn out to be a mask with which commodities and 
capital cheat reason, which in this sense would grant them an initi-
ative of which reason itself, actually, holds the monopoly. Marx, as 
seen by Latour, would thus participate in the Protestant war against 
the worship of icons, because the Reformation would remain 
the model of all the efforts made by modernity in order to purify 
humans of their hybridizations with the fetishistic activity of things 
(White, 2013, p. 673). Except that fetishism is in no way a belief or 
a deception, for Marx, but rather the real form that the relations 
between individuals and things take in the historical movement of 
capitalism. Thus, it is precisely on the definition and function of 
form in Marx’s reflection (but “as form”, underlines Hylton White) 
that, according to commentators, Latour’s critique would stumble. 
Marx himself had actually pointed this out very clearly: 
Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product 
of labour, as soon as it assumes the form of a commodity? 
Clearly, it arises from this. form itself. The equality of the 
kinds of human labour takes on a physical form in the equal 
objectivity of the products of labour as values; the meas-
ure of the expenditure of human labour-power by its dura-
tion takes on the form of the magnitude of the value of the 
products of labour; and finally the relationships between the 
producers, within which the social characteristics of their 
labours are manifested, take on the form of a social relation 
between the products of labour (Marx, 1990, I, p. 164).
Marx makes no reference to a presumed distortion of contents or to 
their concealment (Vandenberghe, 2006, p. 168), but rather argues 
that he wants to analyse the manner in which these contents 
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correspond to the abstract form of social relations between com-
modities. This is not a deception, since “it is not people who orig-
inate these abstractions but their actions” (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p. 
20). However, if the fetishistic character is inherent in the form in 
which social determinations actually interact with or enact each 
other (betätigt werden, are put into action, activated), we would 
not seem to be grappling with the appearance or the phenomenal 
translation of a thing in itself, but rather with the Aristotelian form 
defined as the passage from potentiality to actuality. Along these 
lines, building on a note from the second chapter of A Contribution 
to the Critique of Political Economy, a paragraph to which not even 
White and Vandenberghe pay attention, perhaps abandoning the 
idea of making it quite clear what is the distance that separates 
the fetishistic character of the commodity from the caricature that 
Latour is actually making of it. Marx writes: “The two peculiarities of 
the equivalent form we have just developed will become still clearer 
if we go back to the great investigator who was the first to analyse 
the value-form, like so many other forms of thought, society and 
nature. I mean Aristotle” (Marx, 1990, p. 151). Obviously, this is a 
path that would require a much more detailed and meticulous work 
of analysis, of which I will limit myself to sketching out the prereq-
uisites, but which, even if incomplete, allows us to confirm Marx’s 
radical extraneousness to the terms within which Latour interprets 
his modernity. 
According to Latour, the canonical formulation of this modernity 
would be given by Kant, the architect of the “total separation” 
between the two “pure forms” of the subject and of the thing in 
itself, which by remaining unattainable then allows the same sub-
ject to claim the origin of the action in relation to the derived forms 
of the phenomenal world (Latour, 1993, pp. 56-58). But “Kant’s 
Copernican revolution – he adds – is only one in a long line of 
examples. Yet we have nothing that recounts the other aspect of 
the story: how objects construct the subject” (p. 82). It will there-
fore be worth pointing out that something exists, on the contrary, 
because Marx himself had written: 
The object of art – like every other product – creates a public 
which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. Production thus 
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not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject 
for the object. Thus production produces con sumption (1) 
by creating the material for it; (2) by determining the manner 
of consumption; and (3) by creating the products, initially 
posited by it as objects, in the form of a need felt by the 
consumer. It thus produces the object of consumption, the 
manner of consumption and the motive of consumption. 
Consumption likewise produces the producer’s inclination 
by beckoning to him as an aim-determining need (Marx, 
1973, p. 92). 
And this is because “a railway on which no train run, hence which 
in not used up, not consumed, is a railway δυνάμει [potentially] 
and not in reality” (p. 91). The opinion of Sidney Hook, according 
to which the starting point necessary to understand Marx remains 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, would therefore be confirmed (Hook, 1950, 
p. 36). Even the railway is a matter of tracks, cars, locomotives, 
train drivers, other individuals and platforms that only through the 
concrete consumption of that same matter in the form of a rail-
way (the action) becomes real, that is when “the object is not an 
object in general, but a specific object which must be consumed in 
a specific manner, to be mediated in its turn by production itself”. 
Marx’s adherence to the core of Aristotelian metaphysics, which 
in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 had already 
pushed him to proclaim the abandonment of abstraction (Jaulin, 
2016, p. 116), is then immediately contrasted with the wrong con-
clusions that “a Hegelian”, could have drawn on the relationship 
between production and consumption, thus lending credence to 
the thesis according to which nineteenth-century reflection seeks, 
in reference to Aristotle, a “counter-model to leave German idealism 
behind” (Thouard, 2004, p. 10). But, above all, this adherence allows 
us to clarify how the definition of the form as a form, can provide a 
point of support to grasp the limit of a not very reflective policy, as 
well as denying the way in which Latour interprets Marx in On the 
modern cult of the factish gods. 
According to Aristotle, Paul Ricoeur wrote, the reduction of 
substance to form is inspired by the search for “what deter-
mines reality, what gives it a stable and identifiable status. […] His 
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anti-Platonism, which leads him once again to submerge forms 
in things, to the point of identifying them physically and logically 
with things, does not push him to pursue reality even in its most 
individual existence” (Ricoeur, 2011, p. 241). Because such a real-
ity remains the combination of form and matter, but a matter that 
“is no longer identified with an inert, indeterminate, unknowable 
substrate, but that represents the least determined in relation to 
the most determined in a production process” (p. 223). Matter, in 
other words, is “the system of means and obstacles by virtue of 
which a form opens its way to existence”, a road that is maintained 
between “the possible and the real”, therefore, forcing Aristotle to 
“develop the difficult notion of an actuality of what is in potency, 
in short the idea of  an imperfect act” (p. 227). Therefore, that of 
“naked potency” or “pure matter” is only an abstract limit, “since the 
possibility of everything is never encountered, but only it’s deter-
mined inclination”. And change, consequently, always refers to a 
faculty of matter, to being “capable of”, to the aspirations of a form 
which, “by defining itself, defines the matter that suits it”. Matter, 
therefore, is not “an unknown thing in itself”, concludes Ricoeur, 
quoting Georges Rodier, but only “the indeterminate in relation to 
a more determined”, which means that “what is matter relatively 
to a more determined thing, is form relatively to a simpler thing” 
and “what is form in relation to its simpler elements, is the matter 
of a more complex thing”. And in this sense production is a trans-
mission of form, so “in production the form is not generated, but 
pre-existing” (p. 235). 
Ricoeur’s conclusions allow us to underline how the form as form, 
according to Aristotle and Marx, is never placed in relation to an 
ontological purity (the naked matter or the pure form of the sub-
ject that claims the action erroneously attributed to commodities) 
but contrasts universalism with the importance of a determined 
and dynamic impurity, which exposes reality to the effects of 
contingency and history (Meikle, 1985, p. 165), that is, to change. 
Which by referring to potency as a faculty of matter, creates a ten-
sion between the not merely social determinations of pre-existing 
forms and the composite substance of the present. If in the third 
to last chapter of Down to Earth we come across the proposal to 
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move from “an analysis in terms of production systems to an anal-
ysis in terms of generative systems”, it is precisely because Latour 
conceives the relationship between history and forms in a differ-
ent way. In the twelfth book of Metaphysics Aristotle wrote: “After 
these things <say> that neither the matter nor the form comes to 
be – I mean the last ones. For in every case of change, something 
changes, is changed by something, and changes into something: 
by what: the first mover; what: the matter; into what: the form” 
(Aristotle, 2019, Λ, 3, p. 24). The same fetishistic character of com-
modities, therefore, could describe the tendency of less determined 
forms (which in any case are already “something”) to change into 
the abstract form of the social relationship between the commod-
ities themselves. By identifying it instead with the mystification 
of a purified and transcendent form, that is the “social”, Latour is 
not only inaccurate, but ignores the Aristotelian dimension of the 
imperfect act within the “system of means and obstacles by virtue 
of which a form opens its way towards existence”, this seems to 
hope for a total overlapping between form and matter with mes-
sianic characteristics, an event that elsewhere he calls materiality 
and which he understands as what is produced “by letting time flow 
from the future to the present”. Because the point, he explains, “is 
that the shape of a human subject like Kutuzov or the Army Corps 
of Engineers is not better known beforehand than the shape of a 
river, of an angel, of a body, or of a brain releasing factor” (Latour, 
2014, p. 12). Could we then define dialectic as that thing for which 
Aristotle and Marx, in their striving for tangibility, would probably 
not fail to argue to Latour that Kutuzov, to begin with, although he 
cannot be known beforehand he also cannot be reduced to a totally 
purified indetermination with a universalistic vocation, he is, for one 
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In memory of Mario Lavagetto
Rahel Jaeggi recently observed how the definitions of capitalism 
often tend to represent its characteristics in terms of social or eco-
nomic injustice, in relation to globalization or the decline of national 
autonomies, when they do not run the opposite risk of interpreting 
the mode of production as a synonym of modernity and reduce it 
to a subject of cultural criticism. What would be lacking in those 
kinds of approaches, Jaeggi argues, is the labour that no one has 
yet undertaken but that would remain to be tackled urgently, is an 
analysis of capitalism as a “form of life” (Fraser, Jaeggy, 2018, p. 
14). Yet, it is precisely the expression “form of life” that appears in a 
passage of the Prison Notebooks that will perhaps be worth reread-
ing, in view of an entry to the understanding of the philosophy of 
praxis1 which allows us to grasp any protrusions with respect to a 
very fashionable notion such as that of making, developed by Tim 
Ingold. To set up this program, an enlightening premise could be 
provided by the confirmation of how Antonio Gramsci’s reflection is 
not in fact extraneous to the problems on which the immanent cri-
tique of capitalism as a form of life led by Rahel Jaeggi converges. 
In particular, one of the properties that this critique attributes, with 
greater insistence, to “the different cultural forms that human life 
1  In the text I will use the term “philosophy of praxis” when I want to refer 
expressly to Antonio Gramsci’s critical proposal and “philosophy of practice” in 
the other cases.
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can assume” is that of inertia. Forms of life “are inert bundles of 
social practices”, writes Rahel Jaeggi, that is to say that 
they maintain “sedimentary elements”, praxis components 
that are not always accessible, explicit, or transparent. To 
put it differently, the practices formative of life forms can 
have states of aggregation ranging from more fluid to nearly 
fixed. We also have to take into account that social practices 
and forms of life are “materialized” in institutions and, even 
more “materially”, in architecture, tools, bodies, material 
structures which (though themselves the results of actions) 
make us act (Jaeggi, 2015, pp. 5-7).
Consequently the forms of life do not necessarily imply a choice, 
because individuals can adhere to the uses predisposed by their 
sedimentation without even knowing it: “They are patterns in which 
we act, patterns which allow us to act and yet which are at the 
same time constituted by our actions” (p. 17). If, on the one hand, 
inertia tends to overturn the relationship between the subject and 
the object, therefore giving the implementation of a pattern the ini-
tiative on which the possibilities of movement depend, on the other 
hand (“at the same time”) the persistence and the concrete forms of 
that pattern still depend on the subject they “make to act”. Gramsci 
also attributes a decisive meaning to these “sedimentary elements” 
inherent in the circular relationship between the subject and the 
object. In Notebook 8 and Notebook 11, the problem arises with 
respect to the tendency of classical economics to identify the iner-
tial dimension with nature, whereas for the philosophy of praxis it 
is rather a question of “noting how relatively ‘permanent’ forces are 
constituted in the historical development, operating with a certain 
regularity and automatism” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 1479). It is the same 
reason why, to each individual corresponds a multiplicity of “histor-
ical types” whose traces it is necessary to catalogue (p. 1376). In 
the first preface to The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State, with an apparently paradoxical formula, Engels referred to 
the same necessity to establish that “according to the materialistic 
conception, the determining factor in history is, in the last resort, 
the production and reproduction of immediate life”. Immediacy is 
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historically mediated and reproduced, so it happens that even just 
by using words like dis-aster or dis-grace, Gramsci writes, we inherit 
the wastes of astrology or the doctrine of predestination (pp. 1427-
1428), because even the language in which we constitute ourselves 
“is both a living thing and a museum of fossils of life and past civ-
ilizations” (p. 1438). The philosophy of praxis, therefore, does not 
intend to assign to action a natural or vitalistic primacy over theory 
(which Gramsci regards rather as a figure of primitive mentalities), 
but to perceive in action an always contingent way of receiving and 
recombining the permanence of past ideologies. 
The passage in which the various instances of nature, history, 
automatisms and philosophy merge in a more synthetic way, is 
probably the one in which Gramsci writes:
When dealing with the question of the “objectivity” of knowl-
edge from the point of view of historical materialism, the 
point of departure should be the affirmation by Marx (a well-
known passage in the introduction to A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy) that “men become conscious 
(of this conflict) on the ideological level” of juridical, polit-
ical, religious, artistic, or philosophical forms. But is this 
consciousness limited solely to the conflict between the 
material forces of production and the relations of produc-
tion – as Marx’s text literally states – or does it apply to all 
consciousness, that is, to all knowledge? This is the problem 
that can be worked out with the whole ensemble of the phil-
osophical theory of the value of ideological superstructures. 
How is “monism” to be understood in this context? It is obvi-
ously neither idealistic nor materialistic “monism,” neither 
“Matter” nor “Spirit,” but rather “historical materialism,” that is 
to say, concrete human activity (history) namely, activity con-
cerning a certain organized “matter” (material forces of pro-
duction) and the transformed “nature” of man. Philosophy of 
the act (praxis), not of the “pure act” but rather of the “impure” 
– that is, the real – act, in the most secular sense of the word 
(Gramsci, 1996, pp. 176-177).
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The activity of man can only remain within a definition of matter 
or nature which, precisely in function of their historically mediated 
and organized immediacy (Mann, 2009; Pizza, 2020, pp. 111-126), 
contaminate any metaphysical purification, inducing Gramsci to 
suspend judgement (“This is the problem”) on the same source 
(“Marx’s text”) to which he is referring his definition of objectivity. 
More precisely, the polemical reference to the pure act establishes 
an explicit comparison with the reflection of Giovanni Gentile, who in 
1899 published his interpretation of the philosophy of practice with 
which Gramsci now seems willing to settle the bill. According to 
Gentile, Marx would have understood practice as “sensitive human 
activity”, production of the object but also “practice that overturns”, 
that is to say that it is determined in relation to the activity of objects 
“both practical and theoretical” which react to their origin in prac-
tice itself and modify it (Gentile, 2014, pp. 138-139). This way, Marx 
would have done nothing but “substitute the spirit with the body, the 
idea with meaning: and the products of the spirit [...] with economic 
facts”, which are the products of sensitive activity for the satisfac-
tion of material needs (p. 223). But the “synthesis of cause with 
effect” that allows him to legitimately criticize Feuerbach, Gentile 
argues, remains anchored to an activity of sensible matter that phil-
osophical reflection does not recognise, because matter as such is 
always identical to itself and it never changes: it is the forms that 
change. Clay is always clay, he explains, it is the vases that make 
the difference. And where there can be no change, that is to say in 
clay as a material, history cannot be involved either, which involves 
a coexistence of clay and a form (practice) that must therefore tran-
scend sensible reality. The contradiction of Marx, therefore, would 
consist in having identified sensible reality with matter, while form 
and content, that is to say sensitive activity (practice) and matter 
(which in itself is “inert”) must remain distinct (pp. 231-232). And it 
is precisely this distinction that Gramsci rejects, promoting a phi-
losophy of the “impure” act that claims a more constitutive relation-
ship with the historical mediation of “Matter” and materials, their 
inertia and their impurities, namely their “Spirit”. In other words, 
it could be established that while it brings historical materialism 
back “to the Platonic view of ideas”, where the senses would simply 
substitute the spirit but retaining its “driving and creative functions 
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of universal reality” (p. 231), Gentile cannot help but grasp its 
contradiction by mobilizing an equally Platonic definition of matter 
as a passive receptacle of forms. The clay “inert” in itself, must in 
fact refer to an idea or a pure form of the clay-material which for the 
philosophy of praxis no longer has much to do with reality, which in 
a second draft of the passage previously reported, Gramsci invites 
us to consider not only “in the most profane”, but “worldly sense of 
the word” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 1428). The same distance that sepa-
rates the pure act from the impure act can emerge from the differ-
ent connotations that the second Thesis on Feuerbach assumes 
in the translation of Gentile and in that of Gramsci. For the former, 
Marx would have argued that practice allows man to prove “the 
positivity” (Diesseitigkeit) of his own thought, whereas Gramsci 
translates the same word with the expression “earthly character” 
(Gramsci, 1975, p. 2355), referring to a solution of greater porosity 
between the subject and the object of knowledge (Frosini, 2004). 
But the divergence that is determined in relation to the two different 
interpretations of materialism would be confirmed above all by the 
examination of a second case of “translation” which finally brings 
us back to the problem posed by Rahel Jaeggi. Even Gentile, to clar-
ify the notion of “practice that overturns”, resorts to the rewording 
of the same page of the “Marx’s text” on which Gramsci identified a 
“problem”. And so he writes:
The social man produces; and what does it produce? 
Capital. Here is the subject on the one hand, and the object 
on the other: the productive forces on the one hand and the 
products, capital on the other; hence the judicial forms. The 
practice is overturned; and the productive forces change 
and grow; and by growing they are in contradiction with the 
judicial forms already established with respect to another 
practice. But since in practice lies the indefectible, the nec-
essary reality, development cannot stop; and the class 
struggle is immediately determined by the conflict between 
the productive forces and the forms of production, or the 
law, if you prefer (Gentile, 2014, p. 160).
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At first glance, Gentile remains quite faithful to the “Marx’s text”, 
which in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy he said precisely:
At a certain stage of development, the material productive 
forces of society come into conflict with the existing rela-
tions of production, or – this merely expresses the same 
thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the 
framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms 
of development of the productive forces these relations turn 
into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The 
changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to 
the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. 
In studying such transformations it is always necessary to 
distinguish between the material transformation of the eco-
nomic conditions of production, which can be determined 
with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, 
religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms 
in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it 
out (Marx, 1972, p. 21).
Except in those same lines, Marx is describing the path that led 
him from legal studies and from the critique of Hegel’s philosophy 
of right (1843) to the discovery “neither legal relations nor political 
forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the 
basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but 
that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life”. 
It is in this perspective that he considers it necessary to specify the 
position that judicial forms and law will now have to occupy, which 
in the ensembles of “production relations” or of “material relations 
of existence” appear to be only an expression. In other words, it is 
the development of the discourse that motivates the reference to 
the equivalence between the relations of production and property 
relations, but only because it is important for Marx to clarify that 
the latter (that is, the subject he himself dealt with in his youth) has 
to be included in the definition of the former and not vice versa. 
On the contrary, by removing the paraphrase from the context and 
resolving it in the conflict “between the productive forces and the 
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forms of production, or the law, if you prefer”, Gentile carries out 
a reduction of social relations in the juridical forms that in addi-
tion to misinterpreting the “Marx’s text” leads him in a diametri-
cally opposite direction with respect to the perplexities expressed 
by Gramsci. Who, in Notebook 11, by rewriting the paragraph on 
objectivity and the impure act, not only reaffirms that the con-
flict identified by Marx remains that “between the material forces 
of production and the relations of production – according to the 
letter of the text” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 1492), which obviously does 
not need any reference to the law, but in the immediately following 
paragraph of Notebook 4, wanting to tackle the “problem” that has 
just emerged from the reading of A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, he quoted from memory some phrases which 
assume a decisive importance in the development of our reason-
ing. Gramsci writes:
This is the crucial problem of historical materialism, in my 
view. Basics for finding one’s bearings: 1) the principle that 
“no society sets itself tasks for the accomplishment of which 
the necessary and sufficient conditions do not already exist” 
[or are not in the course of emerging and developing]; and 
2) that “no society perishes until it has first developed all the 
forms of life implicit in its internal relations” (check the exact 
wording of these principles) (Gramsci, 1996, p. 177).
But as he will be able to verify shortly after returning to the literal 
translation of the text, the second element he indicated differs 
in a surprising way from Marx’s “exact enunciation” because as 
Gramsci himself wrote better: “A social formation does not perish 
before all the productive forces for which it is still sufficient are 
developed” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 2359). In the meantime, however, the 
productive forces (alle Produktivkräfte) will for a moment be trans-
formed into “forms of life”, in fact, implying the substantial non-ex-
istence of a “pure” force, independent of the social forms in which 
it is expressed. The objectivity generated by the conflict, therefore, 
will necessarily be understood permanently, always “in the course 
of development and emergence”, as an immanent tension in his-
torical mediation and to the automatisms that intervene and are 
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specified in the “earthly character” of any practice, not only the 
economic and revolutionary one. And so, through Gramsci’s cri-
tique and oversights, it would seem that one is projected into the 
exact point where Rahel Jaeggi has written:
By “form of life,” I mean social formations constituted 
through what I call “ensembles” of practices, and these 
include economic practices as well as social and cultural 
ones. The whole point of a “form of life” approach in this 
context is to understand economic practices as social prac-
tices – in a continuum with the other practices together and 
in connection to each other. If we can understand forms of 
life as more or less inert and more or less robust aggregate 
ensembles of social practices of different kinds, economic 
practices also belong within the scope of this context of 
practices. Economic practices are therefore not “the other,” 
but rather a part of the socio-cultural fabric of society 
(Fraser, Jaeggi, 2018, p. 198).
Where Gentile tended to purify the same relations of production, 
therefore, bringing them back to the force of law, in order to grasp 
this possible correlation between Gramsci’s “problem” and Rahel 
Jaeggi’s definition it is essential to move in the opposite direction, 
as we said, tending towards excluding the hypothesis of a practice 
external to the “juridical, political, religious, artistic or philosophical 
forms” that substantiate matter, because even the potter’s activity 
never deals with a clay that a moment before was just clay. 
This then seems to me to be the terrain on which we could pos-
sibly set up a comparison between the philosophy of praxis and 
the notion of making, starting from a statement by Tim Ingold 
which immediately resonates with the results of a first comparison 
between the historical materialism as interpreted by Gramsci and 
that interpreted by Gentile. Ingold writes:
We are accustomed to think of making as a project. This is 
to start with an idea in mind, of what we want to achieve, 
and with a supply of the raw material needed to achieve 
it. And it is to finish at the moment when the material has 
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taken on the intended form. At this point, we say, we have 
produced an artefact. A nodule of stone has become an 
axe, a lump of clay a pot, molten metal a sword. Axe, pot 
and sword are instances of what scholars call material cul-
ture, a phrase that perfectly captures this theory of mak-
ing as the unification of stuff supplied by nature with the 
conceptual representations of a received cultural tradition 
(Ingold, 2013, p. 20).
The “stuff supplied by nature” certainly refers to a clay that is always 
identical to itself, as Gentile might define it, which for Gramsci on 
the contrary can only be given in a form and supplied by history. 
Gentile, from this point of view, would be placed on the same level 
as economists for whom the inertia of automatisms is a character 
that identifies the natural dimension. To the hylomorphism of this 
conception, Ingold himself therefore opposes the morphogenetic 
principle according to which the making results in a “process of cor-
respondence”, that is to say that it is not accomplished through “the 
imposition of a preconceived form on a raw material substance”, 
but with “bringing out or giving realization to the immanent poten-
tial in an evolving world”. We are clearly close to the Aristotelian 
form, no less implicit than the “forms of life” that Gramsci has inci-
dentally placed in relation to material relations. Because of this, 
Ingold writes, the maker must be understood “as a participant in 
amongst a world of active materials” (Ingold, 2013, p. 21), seem-
ingly the same ones that Gentile considered absurd. Yet to the “inert 
matter” still corresponds a force of inertia with which one side of 
Gentile’s reflection partially adheres to what in Gramsci’s perspec-
tive could be considered not only the “problem” in the preface to 
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, but also of the 
making. In fact, having defined as active the material that together 
with the maker participates in the production of the object, Ingold 
then immediately hastens to interpret their cooperation as a union 
of “forces”, which would allow the production process to operate 
“in anticipation of what might emerge”. Reading making longitu-
dinally, therefore, means considering it “as a confluence of forces 
and materials, rather than laterally, as a transposition from image 
to object”, in order to finally understand it “as a form-generating 
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process” (p. 22). But the orientation of the causal link or the real 
hierarchy that in this way would be established between force and 
form, tends to isolate the “activity of taking shape” from the imma-
nence of all other images and of all other forms that according to 
Gramsci, in order for there to be a force, concur to shape any prod-
uct in relation to its statutory historical and social consistency, to its 
“earthly character”. 
Thus, in the absence of a necessary study, Ingold’s longitudinal 
cut or morphogenetic process risk temporarily complying with the 
logic of what Marx defined as a Robinsonde, as if the product could 
really be determined outside the relations and sedimentations that 
by shaping the material characterize its activity. After all, Ingold’s 
opinion on the status of automatisms appears quite evident when 
he writes that “as the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus is 
alleged to have said of the waters of a flowing river, you cannot 
step twice into the current of social life” (Ingold, 2018, p. 60). The 
repetition is only apparent, or rather phenomenal: these are the con-
clusions to which one might arrive after a first evaluation of the way 
in which the “form of life” itself (almost always in the singular) is 
characterized in Ingold’s pages. In a text such as The Perception of 
Environment, for example, not only does this formula appear often 
but it is specified in relation to its philological source with a lexical 
choice that from our point of view could prove to be emblematic. 
Ingold writes:
Drawing an explicit parallel with tool-use, Wittgenstein made 
much the same point about the use of words in speech: dif-
ferent words have different uses, just as do the pen, watch 
and spectacles; one normally attends not to the words 
themselves but to what the speaker is telling us with them, 
and they are bound together solely by virtue of the fact that 
the various situations of use are all embedded within a 
total pattern of verbal and non-verbal activity, a form of life 
(Ingold, 2010, p. 407).
Ingold then establishes an identity between the form and the model 
(a total pattern of verbal and non-verbal activity, a form of life) which 
albeit with some internal oscillations (Majetschak, 2010), does not 
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necessarily find a correspondence in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
where the models of life (Lebensmuster) would rather indicate the 
psychological and individual relationship with the forms (Moyal-
Sharrock, 2015). And in this way, the forms would risk taking on 
a more derivative or in any case external function with respect to 
the immanence of uses. It is not surprising then that in an attempt 
to document the hypothesis of a possible influence of Gramsci 
(through Piero Sraffa) in the reflections of the later Wittgenstein, 
Franco Lo Piparo wrote:
In Gramsci the terms “linguistic game” and “form of life” 
are missing. However, the notion of praxis, is central to 
Gramscian philosophy, a term and concept that entered 
Wittgenstein’s theoretical lexicon starting from 1936 [where] 
it does not indicate a generic action. If this were the case, it 
could be given a subjectivistic and individualistic meaning. 
The term instead refers, in the style of the Gramscian phi-
losophy of praxis, to stable forms of life (Lo Piparo, 2014, 
pp. 75-87).
But also with reference to the discovery of their fortuitous appear-
ance, the forms of life effectively replace a term (the productive 
forces) to which the philosophy of praxis and the Prison Notebooks 
cannot grant the “subjectivistic and individualistic meaning” that 
would seem to connote the “form of life” that is the “model” defined 
by Ingold. A third angle from which to grasp the same “problem”, 
relates to the concept of “abstraction”, which Ingold interprets 
exclusively in terms of the loss of all the specific characteristics of 
the concrete situation (Ingold, 2014, p. 12). In the case of a job, for 
example, the abstraction would be what would lead to neglect the 
contingency of relationships, of the use of materials and of the way 
in which skills are acquired and applied. It is, precisely, the labour 
abstracted from the “matrix of social relations within which it takes 
its specific form”. For this reason Ingold proposes to call the pecu-
liar and socially incorporated form of human activities no longer 
“work”, but “task”, implicitly postulating the possibility of resolving 
the social dimension in a flow of interactions that escape abstract 
work just like the flow of an actuality in which it is impossible to 
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sink the same foot twice. Because the parallel that Ingold has 
established with Heraclitus’ river, evidently, insists on the same 
premise that the “material processes” involving human activity do 
not differ from what happens and what we can observe daily “in 
plants and animals, in waves of water, snow and sand, in rocks and 
clouds”, so much so that “the difference between a marble statue 
and a rock formation such as a stalagmite, for example, is not that 
one has been made and the other not”. Rather, the difference must 
be sought in the fact that
at some point in the formative history of this lump of marble, 
first a quarryman appeared on the scene who, with much 
force and with the assistance of hammers and wedges, 
wrested it from the bedrock, after which a sculptor set to 
work with a chisel in order, as he might put it, to release the 
form from the stone. But as every chip of the chisel con-
tributes to the emergent form of the statue, so every drop 
of supersaturated solution from the roof of the cave con-
tributes to the form of the stalagmite. When subsequently, 
the statue is worn down by rain, the form-generating pro-
cess continues, but now without further human intervention 
(Ingold, 2013, pp. 21-22: Italics added by me).
We will then say that a broader exploration of the terrain on which 
the philosophy of praxis and the making can be compared, will nec-
essarily have to start from this tendency towards the naturalization 
of historical and social incorporations (with their “sedimentary ele-
ments” and their “forms of life”) in the element of energy and force, 
a “problem” which, in relation to the identification of the statues 
with stalagmites or of the sculptor with rain, Gramsci would proba-
bly have begun to address, provided that “when one affirms that a 
reality would exist even if man did not exist, one makes a metaphor 
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One of the problems that seem to animate Michel Foucault’s 
reflection in the early seventies would seem to be that of the 
relationship between historical research and the liberation of the 
subject. In the period separating the Lectures on the Will to Know 
(1970-1971) from “Society must be defended” (1975-1976), we wit-
ness a series of shifts within the abandonment of the archaeolog-
ical perspective that could already imply the pressure exerted by 
the subject on the boundaries of the forms in which it is historically 
produced and represented. If history really can only advance from 
one dominant regime to the next, what is undermined is the very 
possibility of understanding what the dynamics of this progres-
sion are. To tackle this problem, Foucault relies on a work plan that 
at least until January 31, 1973 he will indifferently call dynastic or 
genealogy. “After an archaeological type of analysis – he says – it 
is a matter of undertaking a dynastic, genealogical type of analysis, 
focusing on filiations on the basis of power relations” (Foucault, 
2015, p. 84). The synonymy is certainly provisional, but the articula-
tions of a much less extemporaneous concept such as that of gene-
alogy allows us to clarify the tendency in which the later aborted 
hypothesis of the dynastic takes place, whose place of appearance 
and experimentation is essentially reduced to the notes about the 
course on Penal Theories and Institutions (1971-1972). 
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The term is introduced in reference to the “manifestation of power”, 
which is always placed in relation to someone it must represent, on 
the basis of certain hierarchies and in precise circumstances. Then 
Foucault adds: “For these ceremonies, rituals, gestures don’t mean 
anything. They do not fall under a semiology, but under an analysis 
of forces (of their interplay, their strategy). The marks that appear 
here must be analyzed not [through] a semiotics of the elements, 
but in a dynastic of forces” (Foucault, 2019, p. 45). The ceremonies, 
rituals and gestures through which power is manifested – both in 
the sense of a power that is staged and that of the power relations 
to which the spectacle of power can be traced back and which 
therefore makes them visible – they do not convey meanings but 
a strategy. The dynastic is therefore characterized in immediate 
opposition to semiotics, because where signs could appear, it only 
captures “the mark” of the forces at work in the unfurling of a form. 
And what is meant by la marque Foucault had already explained it 
during a conference dedicated to Nietzsche and delivered at the 
University of McGill (Montréal) in April 1971. The dual property of 
the mark was that of multiplying and identifying the relations exter-
nal to knowledge that prelude to our position in reality and of which 
knowledge itself remains only an effect. Multiplying the relation 
means extending the domain of knowledge and therefore increas-
ing the number of relations to which the mark (as an act of force) 
imposes the identifying seal of known reality. The work carried out 
by the mark, therefore, consists in simultaneously producing the 
subject of knowledge to which an objective reality corresponds and 
the object corresponding to the force expressed in the generation 
of this correspondence (Foucault, 2013, pp. 211-212). In the last 
lesson of Penal Theories and Institutions which he held on March 8, 
1972, the same day in which he specifies the definition of the mark 
(and therefore of the dynastic) in relation to the sign, Foucault’s 
notes refer to the “Nietzschean analysis which looks behind 
knowledge for something altogether different from knowledge”, 
that is to say “something altogether different in relation to which 
the knowing subject and knowledge itself are effects” (Foucault, 
2019, p. 213). This is evidently analysis that supports his essay on 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, History and the assumption that “human-
ity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it 
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arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces 
warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules 
and thus proceeds from domination to domination” (Foucault, 
1977, p. 151). Genealogy, therefore, will have to re-establish “the 
various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of mean-
ing, but the hazardous play of dominations” (p. 150).
Yet the radication of knowledge on “something completely other” 
which generates at the same time the subject and the object most 
suited to the continuation of war in a system of rules, seems to 
refer to a second incubation of the investigation that Foucault is 
leading now on the terrain of historical research (Mezzadra, 2008). 
It was in fact Étienne Balibar, in the preliminary pages to the theory 
of transition in which he would have introduced his own definition 
of genealogy, to have expressed the need for different histories in 
these terms:
The determination of the objects of these histories must 
await that of the relatively autonomous instances of the 
social formation, and the production of concepts which will 
define each of them by the structure of a combination, like 
the mode of production. We can predict that these defini-
tions, too, will always be polemical definitions, i.e., they will 
only be able to constitute their objects by destroying ide-
ological classifications or divisions which benefit from the 
obviousness of the ‘facts’. Attempts like that of Foucault 
give us a good example of this (Balibar, 2015, p. 524).
The attempt to which Balibar refers in the footnote is “above all” 
that of The Birth of the Clinic, the same one to which Foucault refers 
in September 1972 to emphasize how in the two preceding books 
The Order of Things he had already encountered the need to set up 
“the analysis of the power relations that underlie and make possi-
ble the appearance of a type of discourse”, that is to say a “dynastic 
of knowledge” (Foucault, 1997). However, Marx had already made 
a similar attempt which had been possible to translate into the lim-
its of the “right break of periodization”, Balibar argues, that is, into 
a mode of analysis which, while generating alternative objects to 
those of the ideological sections, reaffirmed the principle according 
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to which “history, without ceasing to unfold in the linear flux of time, 
becomes intelligible as the relationship between an essential per-
manence and a subordinate movement” (Balibar, 2015, p. 458). Men 
themselves, in this theoretical perspective, can only appear in the 
form of supports to the relations involved in the structure, and the 
forms of their individuality as determined effects of the structure, 
entailing a total correspondence between the possibilities of the 
constitution of the subject and the dynamics of subjection. In other 
words, the question that a “history as a science” will have to answer 
will be that relating to the combination on which the elements to be 
analysed depend, but if all the elements and their movement remain 
subordinated to the permanence of a dominant structure, how is it 
possible to think of the passage from one combination to another? 
This is the problem that Marx would have solved in the chapter 
on the so-called primitive accumulation of capital, Balibar argues, 
where the passage is thought in terms of the elements and not of 
the structures, that is, in terms of a “genealogy” consistent with the 
discovery of a mode of production that “is constituted by ‘finding 
already there’ the elements which its structure combines” (p. 570). 
Characterizing the “transition” would then not only be the “forms 
of non-correspondence” between the elements and their combi-
nation, which in this regard could more appropriately be defined 
as “pseudo-combinatory”, but the “coexistence between different 
modes of production” or of different anthropological matrices that 
enter into a simultaneous and hierarchical relationship as “relations 
of domination” (p. 606).
In acknowledging Foucault’s attempt to connect history to the “rel-
atively autonomous instances of social formation” and which are 
therefore not fully included in the “normative and regulated forms 
of discourse” which Foucault himself had later declared that he 
wanted to address in The Order of Things (1966), Balibar’s Elements 
for a Theory of Transition (1965) seem to actually pave the way and 
address the problems of a genealogy that the programme of the 
“dynastic” develops in the notes of Penal Theories and Institutions. 
Here, the relatively autonomous instances of social formation 
that Foucault examines are those of the Nu-Pieds, a movement 
which in 1639, rising against the exacerbation of the tax burden 
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in Normandy, had made it clear that the feudal aristocracy was 
no longer able to ensure its control over the land. The army man-
aged to regain control then, but on the one hand we witnessed the 
summary execution of peasants and beggars, while on the other 
the spectacle of war will have to begin to deepen the fault lines 
that separate the various parts of the social body, giving the urban 
bourgeoisie the opportunity to willingly surrender. Therefore, in this 
refraction of war, it is already possible to observe the combination 
of a power that does not just suppress, but at the same time sets 
a norm, that is, a more desirable form of subjection. When the 
power will be able to obtain the same result without bloodshed, 
when it has accepted the objections of the reformers, even the new 
semio-technique of punishment will not derogate from the rule of 
lateral effects, as Foucault defines it in Discipline and Punish, that 
is to say the evidence that “penality must have its most intense 
effects on those who have not committed the crime” (Foucault, 
1995, p. 95). But in the meantime the sedition of the Nu-Pieds will 
have shown what is the legacy that pre-state forms of repression 
are about to hand over to new technologies of control and reg-
ulation of the population. The army would have remained at the 
gates of Rouen, in fact, where civil justice intervened only in the 
early days of 1640, creating the favourable interval for the bour-
geoisie to settle in the political space between the decline of feu-
dalism and the rise of the seditious classes. Except that keeping 
soldiers in the countryside was expensive, as well as weakening 
the borders, so the functions of internal warfare would soon be 
transferred to the armament of a new militia, the police, of which 
Penal Theories and Institutions intends to outline the dynastic. 
Foucault writes:
[…] the bourgeoisie under the Revolution, but espe-
cially in the Napoleonic period, carried out a separation: 
– it truly got rid of feudal (seigneurial or parlementary) 
justice, which, due to its form and purpose it could not use; 
– it rejected the purpose of the new repressive system which 
was established in the seventeenth century (imposition of 
feudal rent) but not the form (or certain formal elements at 
least: the police element). It uses these elements for its own 
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ends. And these ends are no longer the imposition of feu-
dal rent, but the maintenance of capitalist profit (Foucault, 
2019, p. 23).
The police, Foucault concludes, is not a response to delinquency or 
a direct emanation of the economic structure, but a military solu-
tion to the problem of revolts against power: a form that changes 
destination, an element already formed – perhaps Balibar would 
have said – which the structure of capitalism meets and absorbs 
in its own workings. 
Thus, the precise reference of this absorption to the epoch of the 
Revolution and of the Empire, would seem to support the thesis 
of Jacques Guilhaumou who identifies the dynastic with the most 
adequate instrument for understanding the transition from the 
Ancien Régime to the revolutionary period, beyond which, however, 
it would no longer have “reason to persist as an analytic notion, 
giving way to the notion of genealogy” (Guilhaumou, 2016, p. 34; 
Guilhaumou, 2018). Yet, in the interview cited from 1972, Foucault 
does not seem at all willing to define the field of the dynastic pro-
gramme within the boundaries established by Guilhaumou. On the 
contrary, it is always to the relationship between form and destina-
tion that he could refer any attempt to associate discourses with 
“historical conditions, economic conditions, political conditions of 
their appearance and formation” (Foucault, 1997, p. 72), just as in 
Penal Theories and Institutions had happened to the police element. 
This also applies to the speeches held at the Collège de France, for 
example, where according to Foucault
the transmission of knowledge through word, through the 
professorial word in classrooms, in a space, in an institution 
such as a university, or a college, it matters little, this mode 
of transmission of knowledge is now completely obsolete. 
It is an archaism, a kind of power relationship in fact, which 
still drags along like an empty shell. Even when the profes-
sor no longer has real power over the students, the form 
of this power relationship remains – we haven’t completely 
gotten rid of it yet. I believe that the professor’s word is nec-
essarily an archaic word (p. 77).
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In this case one would say that it is the form that forces the des-
tination, but reiterating a power relationship that obstructs the 
transmission of knowledge still means using that same form “for 
one’s own ends”, as Foucault had pointed out of the “repressive 
system put in place in the 16th century”, that is to say, committing 
it to a peculiar outcome. Therefore, in the case of the lectures at 
the Collège de France, even if they fall outside the historical rele-
vance of the dynastic hypothesized by Guilhaumou, they fall within 
the domain of “non-correspondence” or simultaneous concur-
rency between different modes of production which opposes the 
“relatively autonomous instances of social formation”, as Balibar 
defined them, to the “normative and regulated forms of discourse” 
with which Foucault identified the limit of movement of archaeol-
ogy. The same indication therefore seems to emerge from this pas-
sage of an interview in which Foucault recounts: 
I was recently reading an article in “La Pensée”, which was 
beautifully written, by a guy I know well, one of Althusser’s 
collaborators named Balibar. This article interests me, but I 
cannot help but smile as I read it, since it is a matter of show-
ing in twenty pages, starting with a sentence or two from 
Marx, that Marx had perfectly foreseen the transformation 
of the state apparatus within the revolutionary process and 
in some way from the very beginning of the revolutionary 
process itself (p. 72).
The article to which he is referring is entitled La rectification du 
Manifeste Communiste and in Balibar’s intentions it would actu-
ally pose the problem of the form that the state can take within 
the revolutionary process. But in reality, Balibar’s conclusions do 
not attribute to Marx any foresight, on the contrary, they could be 
paraphrased as a criticism of the very idea that it is possible to 
anticipate a definition of the preliminary forms of the conflicts in 
which they are determined. Balibar writes: “The existence of the 
state apparatus achieves the political domination of the ruling 
class in a ‘transformed form’, although it is in no way at the origin 
of this domination. At the origin of domination we can only have the 
relation of the forces internal to the class struggle” (Balibar, 1974, 
p. 92). The only determination that remains plausible to hypoth-
esize, therefore, is that of “transformed form”, precisely because 
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on the one hand the overturning of the power relations creates the 
conditions for a “new form” (p. 81), but on the other hand the prin-
ciple remains valid that this form too must correspond to the artic-
ulation of already constituted elements in a new structure. Balibar, 
after all, had already stated this in the previous pages: “If ‘democ-
racy’ and ‘despotism’ are political forms or ‘systems’ defined at the 
level of what Marx also calls social ‘superstructures’, so is any com-
bination more or less contradictory of these forms. [The political 
form] therefore does not have a reason in itself, at its own level, but 
only in its relationship with a material ‘basis’ or better still: with the 
overall process in which it is constituted on a material basis” (p. 79).
The contradictory combination in question is the “dictatorship of 
the proletariat”, of which Balibar excludes that a more meaning-
ful definition than that of “transformed form” can be given outside 
the material process. At this point, then, it is worth resuming the 
reasoning that Foucault is developing in relation to the article by 
Balibar, to which he recognizes a number of reasons. 
Balibar shows with great erudition – continues Foucault – 
with a great aptitude for explaining the text, that Marx had 
said it, had foreseen it. So I admire him, as it is a good expla-
nation of the text, and I smile because I know why Balibar 
does it. He does so because in fact, in the real practice of 
politics, in real revolutionary processes, the solidity, the 
permanence of the bourgeois State apparatus, even in the 
socialist States, is a problem that can be encountered, and 
one that can be encountered now. It would seem equally 
important to me to pose this problem starting from the real 
historical data that are at our disposal, the permanence of 
the structures of the State, for example the permanence 
of the structures of the Tsarist army within the Red Army 
itself at the time of Trotsky, which it is a real historical prob-
lem; therefore I believe that the Marxist problem of the State 
must be solved starting from problems like the latter and not 
starting from an explanation of the texts in order to know 
whether Marx had foreseen it or not... (Foucault, 1997, p. 73)
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The permanence of a tsarist structure within the Red Army, evidently, 
poses the same problem that in Penal Theories and Institutions 
concerned the form and destination of the police element, contra-
dicting the hypothesis that the dynastic perspective, for Foucault, 
can be applied only to the historical period indicated by Jacques 
Guilhaumou. And it is a problem that Balibar himself, albeit in 
more theoretical terms, continues to develop in the passage from 
the “pseudo-combinatory” of Reading Capital to the definition of a 
“transformed form” which abstracting from the “overall process in 
which it is constituted on a material basis” cannot be further deter-
mined. However, these are cases in which we always have to deal 
with the reappearance of an already constituted element to the 
surface of a historical and political conjuncture that re-functional-
ises its permanence. In an attempt to name this internal tension in 
Foucault’s work, Paul Veyne will relate it to what Heinrich Wölfflin 
had defined “the general plastic form of an era” (Veyne, 2001, p. 40). 
At this point, however, it does not seem correct to argue with Hinrich 
Fink-Eitel that “Foucault appropriates the concept and procedure of 
genealogy only thanks to a new comparison of his own thought 
with the work of Nietzsche”, which would have led him to decon-
struct the most consolidated historical contexts “in a plurality of 
contingent fields of origin and in a multiplicity of evolutionary lines 
that cross each other” (Fink-Eitel, 2002, p. 62). Because if the hesi-
tation between the dynastic perspective and the genealogical one 
that we are accounting for really aims to grasp in the emergence 
of history “a certain number of levels, a certain number of mecha-
nisms and modes of functioning”, as Foucault himself asserts, it 
is precisely “to Marx that we owe the possibility of conducting all 
these analyses” (Foucault. 1997, p. 73; Catucci, 2018).
A few months later, in the introductory lectures to the 1972-1973 
course, the articles relating to the debate on the law against wood 
theft will have made Marx a model to “see how to analyse political 
discussions, oppositions, and struggles of discourse within a given 
political situation”. Articles in which, it must be said, it would not 
be odd to surprise Marx struggling with a problem internal to the 
relationship between form and destination, using Foucault’s words, 
since they attribute the bourgeois law the double re-functionalization 
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by which “the landowners exploit the progression of time, which is 
the refutation of their claims, to usurp at the same time the pri-
vate punishment of the barbaric conception and the public pun-
ishment of the modern conception” (Marx, 1950, p. 212). In other 
words, it is precisely capitalism that is formed by ‘finding’ already 
formed the elements that its structure combines. And if now “it is a 
question of making a dynastic, genealogical analysis, based on fili-
ations beginning with power relations”, that is to say “finding which 
are the power relations that have made possible the historical rise 
of something”, further, it is the way in which an element already 
formed contributes to the functioning of a structure that modifies 
its destination that attracts Foucault’s gaze. Who writes:
We have therefore two ensembles: the penal ensemble, 
characterized by the prohibition and the sanction, the law; 
and the punitive ensemble, characterized by the coercive 
penitentiary system. The first ensemble brings with it a cer-
tain theory of the infraction as an act of hostility towards 
society; the second brings with it the practice of confine-
ment. The first is deduced, in an archeologically correct 
fashion, from the State institutionalization of justice, which 
means that, from the Middle Ages, we have a practice of 
justice organized by reference to the exercise of sovereign 
political power […] The other ensemble is formed in a move-
ment of development, not of the State itself, but of the cap-
italist mode of production; in this second system, we see 
this mode of production provide itself with the instruments 
of a political power, but also of a moral power. The genea-
logical problem then, is how these two ensembles, of dif-
ferent origin, came to be added to each other and function 
within a single tactic (Foucault, 2015, p. 111).
To operate the conjunction of these two ensembles is the very 
application of a tactic, which therefore does not limit itself to 
leaving signs on the already constituted elements (object of a 
semiology) but the implication of a specific power relation, the 
imprint of the function which their combination is assigning to 
them, a mark. Then as Alessandro Pandolfi wrote, marks “are 
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signatures, symbols, rituals, gestures, postures and speeches whose 
meaning lies in the use made of them to corroborate or shift, 
unbalance or rebalance power relations” (Pandolfi, 2016). In the 
definition that Foucault will give in 1976, on the contrary, once the 
genealogy will no longer have to do with what “can be inferred in 
an archaeologically correct way” and any reference to the dynastic 
will have disappeared from the picture, the emphasis will seem to 
fall on the negative of the marking intended as knowledge of the 
people and local memory, a potential that the mark itself has dis-
persed and that the genealogical perspective allows to re-launch 
“in contemporary tactics” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8). To understand this 
exuberance or this dispersion of forms, Balibar had introduced the 
motif of the “non-correspondence” between the elements and their 
structural function, attributing the discovery to the “genealogical” 
work conducted by Marx in the chapter on the so-called primitive 
accumulation. With Nietzsche’s genealogy, according to Foucault, 
it would therefore have been a matter of following the complex 
process of any “origin” while maintaining “what happened to it in 
its proper dispersion”, that is to say “identify the accidents and the 
minute deviations” bearing in mind that every inherited form “is 
not an acquisition, a possession that grows and solidifies; rather, 
it is an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogene-
ous layers that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or from 
underneath” (Foucault, 1977, p. 146). In any case, in their contigu-
ity, non-correspondence and what happens in the dispersion of 
origins, deconstruct any acquisition including that of the forms in 
which the systems of subjection and their historical representation 
are determined.
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Spiritism appears to have originated in Heydesville, New York, 
where Margaret and Kate Fox organized what they themselves 
would have called the greatest scam of the century many years 
later. A scam hatched against their mother, initially, distraught by 
the mysterious nocturnal noises that the two sisters enjoyed mak-
ing by cracking the bones of their feet. A third sister would have 
immediately sensed an economic opportunity in the sadism tak-
ing place in the house and thus, in November 1849, after having 
stocked up on the famous tables, the spirits could finally perform 
at the Corinthian Hall in Rochester before the incredulous eyes 
of twelve hundred paying spectators. Just three years later they 
landed in England, where the mania that had already infected seven 
hundred and fifty thousand Americans was taken over by the sci-
entist Michael Faraday, who, having had a table with a top made 
of two boards separated by a layer of marbles built and having 
been able to see that to animate the seances this way, was only 
the board that remained in contact with the hands of the partici-
pants, he deemed that the whole matter could be due to the uncon-
scious actions of the muscles. But once the enigma of the tables 
was solved, which in any case would have continued to slither in 
parlours all over Europe, it was still necessary to understand the 
Pierpaolo Ascari
90
reasons that animated the ectoplasms and the strange apparitions 
that starting from 1861, with the invention of spirit photography, 
ensured that ghosts had an extraordinary increment in audience 
and evidence. 
In the spring of 1874, for this purpose, the Society of Physics 
of the University of St. Petersburg set up a commission for the 
study of mediumistic phenomena which, according to Dmitry 
Ivanovič  Mendeleev, the inventor of the periodic table of ele-
ments, denied apparitions the mitigating factors of good faith 
and sarcastically entrusts them to the attentions of psychiatrists 
(Mendeleev, 1992, p. 64; Rice, 1998). But the attitude taken by the 
commission would immediately have irritated Dostoevsky, who 
follows Mendeleev’s lecture report on the “Nòvoe Vremja” and 
notes in his diary: 
This scientific “haughtiness” is not enough for our spiritual-
ists, not enough even in the event that the commission was 
correct. And this is the whole problem. [...] In fact, everything 
else that the commission has to say is almost as presump-
tuous as this: “They are frivolous people,” the commission 
says, “and they themselves are unconsciously pushing the 
table, and that is what makes it rock; they want to deceive 
themselves, and so the table makes tapping sounds; their 
nerves are frayed; they sit there in the dark; it’s an accordion 
playing; little hooks have been placed in their shirtsleeves” 
[...]; “they lift the table with the tips of their feet” etc. etc. 
And still this will convince none of those who want to be led 
astray (Dostoevsky, 1993, pp. 461-462).
The same accusation made by Dostoevsky, that of not having been 
able to recognize in spiritualism “something that must be treated 
with more regard” (Vinitsky, 2008), art historian John Harvey would 
later make his own many years later. In fact, it is true that spirit pho-
tography represents in the first place a new frontier of profit that 
the pioneer of the discipline himself, William Mumler, does not hes-
itate to cross, in the same era, no less, in which to perform strange 
prodigies are also the tables to which Marx, in the first book of the 
Capital, entrusts the task of illustrating the fetishistic character of 
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commodities. But this profit, in the atelier that the photographer 
inaugurated in New York during the American Civil War, is ensured 
by a socialization of mourning to which religions and traditional 
knowledge, evidently, no longer knew what to offer (Harvey, 2007 p. 
141). The precipitations of history accumulate more corpses than 
the church, institutions or morality are able to bury and so the dead 
reappear in portraits, next to their loved ones, who do not spare any 
expense as long as the new technology gives back a more acces-
sible form to the pain they are examining. The spirit, as Edgar Allan 
Poe wrote in Shadow: A Parable, is also the frightening shadow of 
a multitude speaking to us “in the well-remembered and familiar 
accents of many thousand departed friends”. 
A few months before Mendeleev’s lectures, an event occurred in the 
seventh criminal chamber of the Seine Court which would seem to 
confirm the findings of Harvey and Dostoevsky. In fact, despite the 
confession and subsequent conviction of a self-proclaimed ghost 
photographer, the victims of the scam did not want to give up on 
the idea of  having posed next to the ghost of a dead aunt, of the 
countess du Barry, of Vercingetorix or a pre-Columbian superhero. 
In reality, the photographer’s trick turned out to be rather rudimen-
tary and consisted in exposing twice the same plate: the first time 
with the blurred image of a doll in costume, the second with the 
portrait of the clients (Leymarie, 1875; Chéroux, 2004). But at the 
time, it must be said, the idea that the lens was able to capture 
much more reality than the retina retained had enjoyed considera-
ble fortune, so much so that Hippolyte Baraduc, for example, could 
devote several years of his career to the photographic research 
of souls. Unlike Vercingetorix or the deceased, however, what the 
souls handed to the observer was no longer their own image, but a 
“signature” (Baraduc, 1897, p. 10), a singular imprint of light which, 
from time to time, took the specific form of passion, of a nightmare 
or of the vital energy that hit the plate. In other words, technological 
innovation allows us to carry out experiments that the scientist is 
not yet able to govern, but which would still provide experimental 
proof of how right Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas were in arguing 
that “the soul takes the form of thought” (p. 14). 
Also because in the meantime, despite having directed its heavy 
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artillery against the state of agitation of the apparitions, scien-
tific research must measure itself with a series of inventions that 
tended to make ghosts more and more plausible: Edison’s phono-
graph, Nipkow’s scanning disk, wireless communication, cinema 
and X-rays, in the years of the Belle Époque and a progress deeply 
inherent in the desire of an entire historical block to be duped, 
restore a subject much more disembodied than what is expected 
by the traditional boundaries between the positive datum and 
the mediumistic phenomenon. The cathode-ray tube perfected in 
1878 leads William Crooks to postulate the existence of a radiant 
matter of which the spirits must be made of, according to Cesare 
Lombroso. And thus, technology seems to nourish the formation of 
a “science of the unknown”, as Jurgis Baltrušaitis defines it, which 
“the more it subtilizes, the more it purifies its notions, the more it 
tries to give itself strong grounding, the more it gets lost in the fan-
tastic” (Baltrušaitis, 1989). The “thoughtographs” of Dr. Baraduc 
represent a fairly innocent chapter in the genealogy of this intel-
ligence of inexplicable things, which more generally includes the 
rapports that the images had already established and will continue 
to entertain psychiatry.
 Also in Paris and always in 1875, a much less innocent protagonist 
of the same story dies: his name is Duchenne de Boulogne and in 
1862 he wrote a book titled Mécanisme de la physionomie humaine 
which, unlike Baraduc’s works, does not limit itself to collecting the 
traces of the free circulation of the spirit, but arranges for its capture. 
When the soul is agitated, says Duchenne citing Buffon’s Histoire 
naturelle, the face is transformed into a living picture on which the 
action of muscles creates the image corresponding to the move-
ment of the passions. But proceeding in the opposite direction, it 
is possible to obtain the same image with the use of an electric 
current, summoning on the electrified face a complete catalogue 
of the inner motions and the secret mechanisms that regulate their 
combinations. The doctor assures: “Through electro-physiological 
analysis and with the help of photography I will introduce you to 
the art of correctly painting the expressive lines of the human face, 
an art that could be defined as orthography of physiognomy in 
motion” (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1862, pp. V-VI). His would seem 
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an academy teacher’s program, a sampling of pathognomic con-
stants similar to those illustrated by the theoretical writings of 
Leonardo da Vinci, by Charles Lebrun’s Expression des passions de 
l’Âme or by Rubens’ Théorie de la figure humaine. And indeed, writes 
Duchenne, “the greatest masters of the Renaissance, Leonardo da 
Vinci, Michelangelo (who could be reproached for having abused it) 
and many others whose genius has been strengthened by science, 
they show us with their magnificent works what advantage can be 
gained from anatomical knowledge” (p. 56). But this is still a partial 
advantage, he adds a few pages later, because “only photography, 
as faithful as a mirror, could achieve the desirable perfection” (p. 
65). In this regard, it will not be needless to remember that starting 
from the Parisian Salon of 1859, with a decision that Baudelaire 
would have famously judged ridiculous, photography had been 
officially welcomed into the great world of fine arts, if it were not 
that the desirable perfection to which Duchenne is now referring 
is that of the faces of lab rats disfigured by needles and pliers. But 
this is precisely the equipment with which Duchenne, according to 
Foucault, obtains 
the striking reemergence of surface values within medical 
discourse and knowledge. It is this surface that must be cov-
ered in all its hollows and bumps, and practically by looking 
only, by looking only that far. In fact, and no doubt even more 
than this clinical re-validation of the almost impressionistic 
values of the surface, what is important and, I think, decisive, 
in this new clinical capture of the neurological patient, and 
in the correlative constitution of a neurological body before 
this gaze and apparatus of capture, is that the neurological 
examination is basically looking for “responses” (Foucault, 
2006, p. 299).
Therefore, with Duchenne de Boulogne, the neurological body is 
what constitutes itself through “the substitution of the schema 
of stimulus-response for the schema of stimulus-effect” (p. 300), 
allowing a less passive presence of the soul to emerge to the sur-
face of the face, a spirit to which the neurologist now seems to 
order to come out into the open or to make a noise. This seems 
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to be the epistemological terrain on which psychiatry and spirit-
ualism end up side by side, both relying on photographic evi-
dence. Duchenne would soon be considered a “master” in the 
clinical use of photography and electrodes by Charcot, who in 
1862 began to direct the Salpêtrière, a women’s asylum where 
he will not neglect to set up a photography laboratory and an 
electrotherapy laboratory.
Having positioned itself in a border area between medicine and 
philosophy, a territory on which it must extend and legitimize its 
intervention, the gestation of psychiatric knowledge, first of all, 
needs evidence. It is necessary to heal, of course, but at the same 
time it is necessary to show, exhibit, document, in a rhetorical per-
spective inaugurated by the appearance of a new literary genre, the 
case reports, which Charcot’s lectures in the Salpêtrière amphithe-
atre would push to the limit of theatrical performance. Indeed, the 
horizon of expectation that stimuli must satisfy changes – passing 
from effects to responses or camouflaging the former, more prop-
erly, in the latter – but the knowledge of doctors remains bound 
to a very precise and coherent client. To grasp its mandate it will 
therefore be worth referring to an infamous booklet written in 1771 
by Jean Baptiste Louis de Thesacq, known as Bienville, which in 
the Venetian translation of 1786 will be entitled La Nymphomanie, 
ou Traité de la fureur utérine. In the last lines of the book, Bienville 
ascribes to himself “the glory of having laid the first stone of a 
building” (Bienville, 1886, p. 185) and although the term does not 
yet exist (it will end up in dictionaries only in 1842), it is not forced 
to identify it with fledgling psychiatry. Which, then, will have to deal 
with imagination, where disorders arise that can then degenerate 
into the organic inflammation of the uterus. As for the root causes 
of these disorders, Bienville looks up from the patient’s scandalous 
body and writes:
The laws of society are public needs to which it is convenient 
to sacrifice a quantity of private needs. These laws establish 
certain remedies and preservatives that it was necessary to 
imagine to repair real ills, which would destroy or at least 
subvert the existing order, which is as advantageous as it 
is necessary. For this reason, rights and suitable limits for 
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each sex have also been established. The honest and ordi-
nary education derives from this principle and is subject to 
this remedy. It follows that women are raised with restraint 
and decency often capable of irritating their passions, of 
causing a revolution and disorder in the physical of their 
nature and of making them victims of the public good (p. 
140). 
Four years later, in the Traité des Erreurs Populaires sur la Santê, 
Bienville could attribute the “decadence of the species” not only to 
those “young people that the artificial development of passions has 
made precocious”, similar to the “flames that by dint of being too 
feeble do not heat and ignite anything”, but also to the apparently 
opposed army of “subjects overwhelmed by the sad inheritance of 
the diseases of their fathers or weakened by the vices of exces-
sive education “, equally unprepared to respect the injunction to 
grow and multiply (Bienville, 1775, p. 24). If Bienville’s first stone 
has value, it is above all to highlight the distance that separates it 
from a second inaugural text, a circular letter published in France in 
1785 and titled Instruction sul la manière de gouverner les Insensés, 
et de travailler à leur guérison dans les Asyles qui leur sont destinés 
(Quétel, 2009, p. 182). The circular reacts to the pressures of some 
philanthropic circles who have expressed their disdain for the con-
ditions in which individuals locked up in the poorhouses, where the 
insane are relegated together with criminals, prostitutes, orphans 
and tramps. Now the government recognizes a peculiar status to 
the insane and declares the intention to classify their sufferings, 
to ensure above all the poor a more adequate shelter (Instruction, 
1785, pp. 6-8), but the overall profile of the patient is that of the 
victim not anymore of public good, but of bad luck. And is in this 
humanitarian perspective – as we would perhaps define it today, a 
perspective that for Didier Fassin would have incubated precisely 
in French psychiatry towards the end of the millennium (Fassin, 
2012, pp. 21-43) – that on 27 August 1793 Philippe Pinel arrived 
at the men’s hospice in Bicêtre, from where less than two years 
later he was transferred to the Salpêtrière. Psychiatry was born to 
free the unfortunate from their chains: this is notoriously the scene 
handed down by his son Scipion and then confirmed by the two 
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famous paintings that in 1849 and 1878, both commissioned by 
doctors, portray Pinel in the role of the liberator. Yet, re-reading 
thel Traité médico-philosophique sur l’aliénation mentale, we must 
actually recognize that in the new speciality of medical art invoked 
from Bienville the total transformation of the victims of the pub-
lic good into the victims of themselves or of destiny has not yet 
been completed. It is true, the alienated will be subjected to the 
regulations of a structure faithful “to the principles of purer philan-
thropy”, but the alienation continues to often be the result of a pain 
or love opposed with too much violence. It will rather be with Pinel’s 
first student – Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol – that the public 
good will begin to surreptitiously leave the scene. In fact, when in 
1815 he wrote the entry “Érotomanie” for the dictionary of medical 
sciences, indeed, Esquirol had already transformed the loves and 
pains opposed with too much violence (and that is, the results of 
a, perhaps, excessively rigid but socially conforming education) in 
the loves or pains resulting from “a dissolute upbringing” (Esquirol, 
185, p. 192), in which it is precisely the laws of social reproduc-
tion that are the first not to be reflected. Thus, eight years later, 
the nymphomania of Voisin (Esquirol’s student) may depend exclu-
sively on the dimensions of the cerebellum, where Franz Joseph 
Gall had housed the organ of sexual function and where the public 
good – evidently – had nothing to do with it anymore. 
It appears that this is the tendency that images must favour and 
support, facilitating the shift of disease from political causes to the 
experience of bodies, functions, the face or to the misfortune of the 
sick. For example, Voisin writes in 1826, anticipating in many ways 
the programme of retrospective medicine of Charcot and Richer: 
Every day we can observe individuals who, due to an incom-
plete organization, remain indifferent to the relationship with 
the other sex. Among the men who have trod the world stage 
and have shown this particularity, we can mention Newton, 
Charles XII and Kant. As Gall observed, the portraits of these 
famous men show, and certainly beyond the artist’s inten-
tions, that their neck was not very wide and consequently 
their cerebellum poorly developed (Voisin, 1826, p. 242). 
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But in 1805, when Esquirol was discussing his doctoral thesis, the 
need to make visible the accuracy of what was happening at the 
Salpêtrière, was already causing a significant attraction of alienism 
to physiognomy. The mental alienation does not imply any organic 
injury, Esquirol argues, but rather an alteration of a functional nature 
caused by an increase in passion. If on the one hand, transferring 
the disease from the tissues to the functions allows him to promote 
the benefits of moral treatment, on the other hand, he undermines 
it with the need to create evidence, because the functions unlike 
organs do not end up on the anatomist’s table. And so the signs 
cancelled by the overcoming of the organicistic paradigm reappear 
on the face, just where the theory of painting had abandoned them. 
Esquirol writes: “These physiognomic traits, these organ effects 
are observed in maniacs at even more pronounced levels. To grasp 
the features of the physiognomy of the alienated one should draw 
the heads of many of them, keeping in each the character of phys-
iognomy during access and comparing these heads with those in 
which the greatest masters have applied themselves to paint the 
passions” (Esquirol, 2008, p. 80).
Ambroise Tardieu will therefore draw the heads of the inmates, in a 
series of etchings published in 1838, but in the notes accompany-
ing those images Esquirol does not fail to project the relationship 
between psychiatry and physiognomy into the future, pledging to 
publish a personal reflection on the topic (pp. 179-180). A truly chal-
lenging theme: this was confirmed in 1820 by another student of 
Esquirol and Pinel, Etienne-Jean Georget, for whom “describing the 
physiognomy of the alienated is difficult. They must be observed 
– he writes – to preserve their image” (Georget, 1820, p. 133). 
His exhortation will therefore find an immediate correspondence 
in the series of the ten monomanes, painted for him by Théodore 
Géricault, but it will be Georget himself, who had been resolved to 
keep the images, to lose the five portraits that have been lost. To 
retain every necessary, conclusive but still impenetrable grimace 
of the insane, we will have to wait for the arrival in the mental hos-
pitals of photographic technology, a tool really capable of captur-
ing more reality than that observed and to entrust to a still implicit 
observer the task of completing the artwork.
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A task that more properly resembles a destiny, because 
psychiatrists have few doubts about the fact that one day the 
images will agree with them. In this regard, in his splendid book 
on hysteria, Georges Didi-Huberman attributed to photography 
the function of “anticipating knowledge by seeing”. Because the 
Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière, curated by Désiré-
Magloire Bourneville and Paul Regnard under the direction of 
Charcot (1876-1880), served first of all to prove that the theorem of 
the great hysterical attack, with all the apparatus of presses, hyp-
nosis, toxic substances, dramaturgy and electrostatic baths that 
made it true, one day it would be scientifically proved more definitive 
than the scientists themselves, at the time, were able to prove. The 
demonstration was there, under the eyes of all, at the surface of the 
photographic image, in the anterior future of the responses that the 
neurological body was already providing the observer. And it is pre-
cisely this deferral that transforms the fate of the inmates, in real-
ity, into a hellish page in the history of art. A decisive contribution 
to the realization of this programme was provided by Paul Richer, 
professor of artistic anatomy at the École nationale supérieure des 
Beaux-Arts. His is an important role not only as coordinator of the 
Nouvelle Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière (starting 
from 1888), but because he will be, together with Charcot, the one 
who will be the author of the analyses responsible for document-
ing the emergence of hysteria in all the “monuments of the past” 
who, for lack of means, had not fixed it to the figurative canon of 
the possession. It is the programme already glimpsed in Voisin’s 
reference to the portraits of Kant and Newton, the so-called ret-
rospective medicine which now dates back to the mosaics of the 
fifth century, while behind the “possessed in the grip of convul-
sions for which the doctor could not see any remedy and which the 
priest or the judge took possession of [...], here is a patient whose 
every behaviour, every nuance of her physiognomy, is captured by 
the pencil, the brush and photography, thus assisting the pen that 
cannot describe all the external effects of this strange and cruel 
disease” (Charcot and Richer, 1887, p. XII).
In the meantime, following the enormous editorial success 
achieved by Henri Lasserre with Notre-Dame de Lourdes (1869 
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and in the context of the first pilgrimage of the sick at the 
sanctuary (1873), it was the entire staff of the Salpêtrière that 
mobilized against the re-insurgence and the positivist scandal of 
the sacred. Gilles de la Tourette will deal with a case of nympho-
maniac hysteria set within the walls of an Ursuline convent in 1632 
(this is the case of Sister Giovanna degli Angeli), while Bourneville 
himself will direct the famous series “Bibliothèque diabolique” for 
which Paul Regnard, in 1887, will publish a, in many ways excep-
tional, text, which seems to anticipate some of the themes to which 
Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde will soon give a more systematic 
form. According to the author, the story of the eighteenth-century 
witches or Convulsionnaires should be understood in the perspec-
tive of “social mimicry”, the same to which we must attribute “the 
sudden decisions that make entire populations precipitate into war, 
revolt or riots”. The whole nation seems sick, then, prey to “an epi-
demic that drives it with fury” and that confirms the existence of 
“madness by imitation” (Regnard, 1887, pp. X-XI). 
Something similar, in order to contribute to the effort to bring pil-
grimages back into the perimeter of science, would have immedi-
ately also been supported by Zola, who in the summer of 1892 went 
to Lourdes to gather the documentation essential for the drafting 
of the first of his novels dedicated to Les Trois Villes (Bodei, 2002, 
pp. 195-197). In fact, Zola writes: “Many leave feeling better then, 
in a sursum corda, a contagious hope, a kind of happy epidemic of 
healing, they die on their return saying that they are healed” (Zola, 
2010, p. 39). The protagonist will therefore have the suspect that 
the crowd can force the material to obey it, so much so that the 
solution proposed by Zola in the notes, where in agreement with 
Dostoevsky, he did not fail to contemplate the “need we have to be 
deceived and comforted” (p. 66), remains that of creating a room 
dedicated to the records in which the novel, then, does not neglect 
to introduce photographic equipment, in order to document the 
conditions in which pilgrims arrive at the sanctuary before being 
miraculously healed. Among other things, Zola’s stay will have the 
indisputable merit of involving Charcot himself in the debate, who 
again in 1892, “was inspired by the recent trip of a famous writer 
to a religious sanctuary and from the discussions that have arisen 
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from it”, he is invited to deal with the topic of faith-healing on the 
pages of the “New Review”. But at this point the diagnosis of hyste-
ria will have compromised also the good name of St. Francis and St. 
Teresa, also because the implementation of the healings has “the 
same characteristics in every age, under every latitude, for pagans 
and Christians as well as for Muslims” (Charcot, 1897, pp. 10-14). 
And to whoever reproaches him for always and only speaking of 
hysteria, Charcot points out, one can only answer with the words 
of Molière: “I say the same thing because it is always the same 
thing” (p. 22). A thing which however will continue to entertain with 
the social mandate of images and their “anticipating knowledge by 
seeing” a constitutive relationship, since despite all evidence “we 
must know how to wait – concludes Charcot – always continuing 
to search” (p. 38).
In the meantime, therefore, the hysterics will continue to do their 
part and amplify the plasticity of the crises, contortions, obscene 
poses and ravings foreseen by specialist literature, stimulated by 
the threat that for those most reluctant to appear seductive and 
to reassure the poetics of the director, who wanted them all sick 
with desire and simulation, would come the order to move to the 
department of the incurable. And yet, on those wet plate collodion 
or silver bromide collodion plates, which required infinite exposure 
times and which nevertheless gave the illusion of finally making 
Esquirol’s dream come true, the bodies and faces of hysterical 
women ended up showing much more than the figurative organiza-
tion prepared by the staff of the Salpêtrière wished to show. Theirs 
remained a blatantly scenic presence, in fact, which would have 
made equally blatant the weakness of the theorems to which they 
provided paroxysmal and artificial evidence. In short, those images 
still lacked something, something probably impossible such as the 
unconditional surrender of forms to the flows of intent and power 
that invest them, in the visual perspective of a final cause, to pre-
tend to obtain answers where they only produce effects with a 
strategy that is not entirely alternative – after all – to the impos-
tures of psychics.
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Chapter six
Form, Gender and Class
It seems that the exorcism of metamorphosis connotes Gustave Le 
Bon’s analyses on the psychology of crowds, because the “crowds 
are everywhere distinguished by feminine characteristics, but Latin 
crowds are the most feminine of all”, given that “the fundamental 
characteristics of the race” always intervene to determine their 
mutability (Le Bon, 2002, p. 13) always intervene to determine their 
mutability. As we will see in the last chapter, these are the connec-
tions to which Otto Weininger will adhere in the raving plot of Sex 
and Character, but Émile Zola had already led a first and decisive 
investigation into the relationship between the element of the crowd 
and the construction of the genre, with the eleventh novel dedicated 
to the story of the Rougon-Macquarts: Au bonheur des dames. 
To open the dossier of the novel is an article published in “Le Figaro” 
on 23 March 1881: two weeks have passed in Paris since the fire 
that completely destroyed the Magasins du Printemps, where an 
employee responsible for turning on the lamps at night suddenly 
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set fire to the embroidery department. The author of the article 
believes that the accident should represent a good opportunity to 
start reflecting on one of the greatest economic phenomena of the 
time (Wolff, 2009, p. 736). The starting idea is that the creation of 
these “bazaars” may have introduced into the moral sphere a new 
order of turmoil still unknown at the time of the Comèdie humaine 
and that it is precisely these passions that degenerate into what 
doctors promptly called “department store theft mania”. With this 
article by Albert Wolff, in other words, the figure of the female thief 
immediately enters the scene, to whom the first drafts of the novel 
will assign a decisive role. Because “the good woman who steals 
because of temptation” will have to represent the “high point” of 
the story, a point not better specified but still programmatic (Zola, 
2009, p. 80).
In general, writes Wolff, some symptoms appear on the faces of 
the ladies who come out of the bazaars (dilated pupils, bags under 
the eyes) that make listeners think of a long Berlioz symphony. 
Because, evidently, the merchandise begins to put on a show with 
a great variety of “notes” and “colours” that Wolff only ironically 
associates with the more traditional dimension of the aesthetic 
experience. The previous year, on the contrary, Zola described the 
specular tendency of the old Salons to take on the increasingly 
explicit form of an emporium or a department store of painting, 
but Wolff’s irony seems to just ignore him, just as it must ignore 
that already during the Restoration and the July Monarchy the 
magasin de nouveautés had borrowed their names from theatrical 
successes (Au Pygmalion, Au Diable Boiteux, Au Masque de Fer, Au 
Pauvre Diable) and the signs of the new shops had transformed the 
public street into an open-air museum, as Balzac noted (Demory, 
2009, p. 24). The hotbed of the “new form of neurosis” will therefore 
be restricted to the women of the general public, because those 
of higher extraction have everything they need not to be seduced 
by such a trivial spectacle. Only female thieves who often actually 
belong to the well-to-do class, adds Wolff, can be an exception to 
this rule, however for this very reason they can be considered sick. 
His thesis is explicitly supported by the theories of Henri Legrand 
du Saulle, the psychiatrist who had been studying the phenomenon 
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of thefts in police prefectures for many years and who, moreover, 
since 1879 had become chief physician of the epileptic ward of 
the Salpêtrière. Where, to begin with, he believed that the term with 
which it is usual to indicate the theft of goods in shops, vol aux 
étalages, should be replaced with a more appropriate and literal 
expression, that of vol dans les grands magasins, since a crowd 
of criminals, indigents, perverse children, weak-minded, para-
lysed and senile demented has historically specialized in generic 
shoplifting, and it is therefore wrong to confuse them with the new 
psychiatric and juridical subject (Legrand du Saulle, 1883, p. 436). 
Which intimately has to do with the opening of department stores, 
a specific place in which
women of all standing, attracted to these elegant environ-
ments by the natural instinct of their sex, fascinated by such 
an imprudent provocation, dazzled by the profusion of lace 
and trinkets, are surprised by a sudden, unintended, almost 
beastlike excitement: they lay a furtive, although clumsy, 
hand on one of the items on display and suddenly they 
erase their most commendable past, they turn themselves 
into thieves, become delinquents (p. 437). 
It is precisely this cancellation and this transformation that allow 
medical discourse to enter the sphere of juridical competence, 
indicating in the nature of women (l’instinct naturel à leur sexe) a 
new “principle of coordination” of the senseless action (Foucault, 
2003, p. 132).Which seems to refer in the first instance to the 
seductive power of fabrics, laces, trinkets and more generally of 
the goods exposed “to the greed of the eyes”, but which is rather 
traced back to the impact of these factors on the presumed dis-
position to passiveness of the female temperament (as seducible, 
excitable and fickle). Thus, once he has dealt with the “professional 
women adventurers who live in concubinage with the scammers” 
and who must be held responsible for their actions (Legrand du 
Saulle, 1883, p. 438), the origin of most of the thefts ends up in the 
field of hysteria. The research that Legrand du Saulle did between 
1868 and 1881 – the same research to which Albert Wolff appeals 
in the article that opens the dossier of Au Bonheur des Dames 
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– allowed him to establish that on a sample of 105 pathological or 
semi-pathological women who steal, it is possible to conduct the 
following classification:
Often, explains Legrand du Saulle, “they are girls or women of high 
extraction who belong to an honest environment, who live in com-
fort or possess riches”, or that when questioned they answer: “I 
don’t know why I’ve done it, it is incomprehensible. I don’t lack any-
thing, I don’t need that item and I have the money to pay for it” (p. 
441). Therefore, the theft is of medical competence, but the psy-
chiatrist uses it to support a great gender and class policy: on the 
one side we have the thefts still bound to a need that, by motivat-
ing the crime, makes it prosecutable (the so-called vols délictueux), 
while on the other we find the unmotivated gesture, sans motifs 
et sans besoin, in other words unpunishable. In certifying it, how-
ever, Legrand du Saulle does not neglect to objectify the emergency 
of hysteria (74 out of 105 thieves suffer from it) and to conceal 
the activity exercised by commodities in the statistical value that 
his analyzes attribute to the physiologically female origins of the 
senseless act (menstruation, menopause, pregnancy and heredi-
tary predisposition to any form of hysteria, for a total of 74 cases: p. 
450). This is what journalists and scientists think when the director 
of the department store conceived by Zola begins to believe that 
the real responsibility for the thefts has to be traced back to the 
Very feeble-minded women 4
Alienated hysterics 9
Hemiplegic demented 2
Demented with general paralysis 5
Senile demented 5
Hysterics aged 15 to 42 during the menstrual period 35
Hysterics from 15 to 42 years outside of the menstrual period 6
Hereditary predisposed women (with hysteriform manifestations) 24
Menopausal women or women who are severely debilitated following the 




pressure exerted by the commercial initiative (le résultat aigu de la 
tension exercée par les grands magasins: Zola, 2014, p. 266).
And it is precisely to obtain this charm of beautiful but useless 
things, as he defines it, that the new cathedrals will use some 
strategies borrowed from the magasin de nouveautés but insert-
ing them in a much broader and more articulated programme. In 
this regard, Siegfried Kracauer underlines how in the aftermath of 
the revolutionary fright, the urban mass had matured a real ter-
ror of events, seeking comfort in the nebulosity and in the evoca-
tive power of the name of Napoleon III, who would have had “the 
strange luck to come across a society that was in search of phan-
tasmagoria” (Kracauer, 1994, p. 114). Many of the forms inherited 
or introduced by the department store give the impression of refer-
ring to the effort to deliver commodities totally deprived of consist-
ency to the sight, touch and smell of customers (Verheyde, 2012, 
pp. 16-20). The consistency is, if anything, monetary (with the fixed 
price), mimetic (with the scenic arrangement of the commodities), 
reflected (with catalogues and mail order, which began to circu-
late in 1867), temporary (with the possibility of returning goods) 
and subjective (with the abolition of haggling). “But why are you so 
worried about not straining the eyes? – asks Zola’s director to his 
collaborators – Come on, try instead to blind them”. Thus, while 
commodities no longer appear to be commodities, in the era in 
which “the economy defamiliarised the mind from the evaluation of 
real quantities” (Kracauer, 1994, p. 187), the new properties that the 
department store associates with the products that customers still 
have the comfort of feeling (or observing on the printed page) they 
create a fundamental indifference between the individual genres 
and models of products, rendering understandable, to some extent, 
the behaviour of the female thief, who is surprised during a search, 
with a loot of six hundred of all the same ties (Wolff, 2009, p. 758). 
Because she can be absolved by the same “vertigo in delirium” that 
Charles Baudelaire spoke of in the poem entitled L’Examen de Minuit 
where he accused himself of having drunk without thirst and eaten 
without hunger (nous avons bu sans soif et mangé sans faim), bla-
tantly resonating with the theft sans motifs et sans besoin. 
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And yet, if we give credit to the words of the poet and playwright 
Jean Richepin, in the last weeks of 1881 it is precisely French liter-
ature that has accumulated an unforgivable delay in understand-
ing the new phenomena. Paris has changed, in fact, but reality is 
obscured by the persistence of a great artistic invention, that of the 
nasal and insidious voice of the salesman who at the time of Louis 
Philippe asked customers: “Do you need anything else, madam?” (Et 
avec ça, médême). A character to be completely redone, because 
Balzac’s old salesman has been replaced by the paradigmatic fig-
ure of the calicot, the young man who “voluntarily enlisted in the 
great army of the modern shop and speculation, where one can 
achieve all the ranks corresponding to one’s industriousness, intel-
ligence and audacity” (Richepin in Zola, 2009, p. 742). The calicot 
began by selling two pennies of string, later became a foreman and 
now finds himself “a partner in these huge companies that have 
the importance and budget of a ministry”. Sometimes they are still 
the children of shopkeepers, but to the complaints of their fathers 
and the nostalgia for small business, they oppose the certainty 
that there is nothing to recriminate: “Isn’t it logical and right that the 
majority of consumers take advantage of this transformation?”. In 
short, the calicot would be those who “took the side of the rail road 
against the horse-drawn carriage, of the association against the 
solitary effort, of the interest of all against the interest of someone”, 
but to finally give a soul to the department store, argues Richepin, 
the intervention of someone who is able to create “the novel of 
modern commerce” is not necessary (p. 743). And that is precisely 
the novel that Zola intends to write, a “poem of modern activity” 
that places at the centre of the action, the clash between small 
business and department stores, “these veritable steam engines” 
that Richepin had compared in a similar way to the railway.
But just as the newspapers denounced the lack of interest of lit-
erature towards the calicot, in 1888 it was a writer who com-
plained about the lack of attention that the press was giving to the 
“national scourge” of department stores. The author of the investi-
gation believes that the new maisons d’accaparement constitute a 
growing danger, “that they not only corrupt the family, commerce, 
industry, the well-being of the vast majority of the French, [but also 
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compromise] the morality and reputation of industry to violently 
affect the national budget” (Weill, 1891, pp. 3-4). In 1892, to mobi-
lize against these tendencies and the law that favoured them, the 
trade union league intervened to defend of the interests of work, 
industry and commerce, with a speech delivered in front of the 
chambers by a certain Pierson, who compared the effects of the 
department store to an hypnotic state. Because, what do these 
places do if not multiply the temptations in front of the eyes of the 
customers influenced by suggestion, who eventually confuse water 
with champagne? Thus, the alleged saving of time that the visitor 
would achieve by staying inside the same establishment without 
having to move from one shop to another, is largely nullified “by 
the hours lost to moving among the crowd, to taking into account 
all the departments, to filling one’s eyes with obsessive images, 
to letting oneself be hypnotized by the variety of the performance 
and finally succumbing to the temptation to buy things […] one has 
no need for”. This is why department stores have gained the pri-
macy of thefts, because “the seduction that is released from the 
conjunction of all these temptations is too intoxicating” and “weak 
consciousness cannot resist it” (Pierson, 1892, pp. 11-13).
Except for the fact that, to a certain degree, everyone embezzles 
in Zola’s novel. Customers steal time from staff, store clerks steal 
their salary from the department store, and the department store 
steals business from small stores. “The clerks and above all the 
cashiers also steal”, Zola had already noted on a reconnaissance 
mission at the Grands Magasins du Louvre (Zola, 2009, p. 135), but 
nevertheless it would be precisely the female instinct (“the weak 
consciousness” of Piersen) to establish a privileged relationship 
with the propensity to theft. Zola himself, in another note, would 
seem to confirm the diagnosis: “Meanness among women – he 
writes. – One steals the other’s shift, saying that the customer has 
come for information. She steals a client from her. She prevents her 
from selling, gossiping about her, spying” (p. 177). And to reiterate 
this would be Pierre Giffard in a book of 1882 that Zola probably 
had time to consult (Cnockaert, 2007, p. 30). The feminine eternity, 
he writes, manifests itself not only in theft but also in the “theft 
of returned commodities”, because out of a thousand customers 
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there would be at least two hundred (“but the figure increases every 
day”) who return to the store within forty-eight hours demanding 
to be reimbursed, even when the commodities have already been 
used (Giffard, 1882, p. 240). Even when the shop assistants, rum-
maging in the pockets of the clothes that the ladies assure they 
have not worn, bring to light an archaeology of lies made of bread, 
withered roses, pieces of cheese. After all, adds Giffard, out of a 
hundred ladies who behave like this and return the commodities 
they did not hesitate to use, perhaps sewing the protective labels 
with a different thread from the original one, sixty insolently claim 
to know the director (pp. 243-244). But from this point of view it is 
downright useless to accumulate accusations: that of returns is 
“a pawnshop in reverse” because women have no qualms when it 
comes to surprising the world: they pay, they display themselves 
and then they return after thirty-six hours to get their money back. 
Here is the real “crux of the matter [...], it is the woman who wants 
to appear, the flirt, the frivolous, the seductive, the charming - in 
a nutshell: the woman” (p. 247). So, after the customer spent an 
entire afternoon “handling fabrics, chatting about news, choosing 
fabric scraps, in one word, rejoicing of all her nerves and her little 
brain in the unnerving atmosphere of the galleries”, the department 
store satisfies her.
With a smile on his face - writes Giffard - the cashier makes 
a two-line invoice with half the sum. Then he collects the 
other half and when the delivery man delivers all the pur-
chases at home, the wife will make her husband get the 
wrong end of the stick, as they say, showing him how cheap 
everything was, how the department store must inevitably 
loose money and how it was necessary, in order not to miss 
these incredible deals, to buy all those knick-knacks for the 
modest sum shown on the invoice, which the husband will 
be kind enough to pay. She hugs him lovingly and he pays, 
the poor idiot, without even doubting that the other half of 
the amount was withdrawn without his knowledge from the 
same bank account or from the pockets of a friend by his 
scrounging wife (pp. 252-253). 
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Criminal initiative remains a female prerogative, because the 
distinction between justice and injustice is a distinction “which 
her nature [son état] unconsciously leads her to ignore” (p. 300). 
If it were not that the “pawnshop in reverse”, in Zola’s novel, will 
turn out to be “a masterpiece of Jesuit seduction” (Zola, 2014, p. 
246). On the other hand, Georg Simmel will also argue that it is 
coquetry that can imply an intimately furtive relationship with the 
established order, but on the basis of an assessment that is very 
different from that which animates Giffard’s positivism. Simmel’s 
woman is not naturally coquette, but the genesis and internal dia-
lectic of a specific social form produce the causes that expose her 
to temptations. Coquetry is manifested, for example, with “a side-
long glance with the head half-turned” that it would be wrong to 
confuse with a simple desire for pleasure, because to act in this 
“hint of aversion” is the very possibility of “a momentary focusing 
of attention on the other person, who in the same moment is sym-
bolically rebuffed”, that is to say an expression of freedom. In the 
moment in which the glance is granted, in fact, “the withdrawal of 
the glance is already prefigured as something unavoidable in the 
glance itself. It has the charm of secrecy and furtiveness that can-
not persist, and for this reason consent and refusal are inseparably 
combined in it” (Simmel, 1984, pp. 134-135). But this alternative 
is also a social factor, even in Zola’s novel, where the returned 
commodities and thefts represent the costs that the department 
store seems willing to incur, in the perspective of creating value for 
the shareholder. This is clarified by Octave Mouret himself in the 
chapter in which he must convince a large investor (and partner 
of Crédit Immobilier) to support his projects. The idea of arranging 
a meeting between the merchant and the banker is not Zola’s, but 
of a former salesman of the department store Au Pouvre Diable 
named Alfred Chauchard who starting from 1855, on the lands of 
the Compagnie Immobilière of the Pereire brothers, he began to 
build the empire of the Grands Magasins du Louvre, in rue de Rivoli. 
Zola writes:
And, above the facts already given, right at the summit, 
appeared the exploitation of woman. Everything depended 
on that, the capital incessantly renewed, the system of 
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piling up goods, the cheapness which attracts, the marking 
in plain figures which tranquillizes. It was for woman that all 
the establishments were struggling in wild competition, it 
was woman that they were continually catching in the snare 
of their bargains, after bewildering her with their displays. 
They had awakened new desires in her flesh: they were an 
immense temptation, before which she succumbed fatally, 
yielding at first to reasonable purchases of useful articles 
for the household, then tempted by their coquetry, then 
devoured. In increasing their business tenfold, in populariz-
ing luxury, they became a terrible spending agency, ravaging 
the households, working up the fashionable folly of the hour, 
always dearer. And if woman reigned in their shops like a 
queen, cajoled, flattered, overwhelmed with attentions, she 
was an amorous one, on whom her subjects traffic, and who 
pays with a drop of her blood each fresh caprice. Through 
the very gracefulness of his gallantry, Mouret thus allowed 
to appear the brutality of a few, selling woman by the pound: 
He raised a temple to her, had her covered with incense by a 
legion of shopmen, created the rite of a new religion, think-
ing of nothing but her, continually seeking to imagine more 
powerful seductions; and, behind her back, when he had 
emptied her purse and shattered her nerves, he was full of 
the secret scorn of a man to whom a woman had just been 
stupid enough to yield herself (Zola, 2014, pp. 79-80).
It is not the predisposition or the feminine eternity that determines 
what happens between the departments of the department store, 
it is not the “old story of the woman who never has enough money”, 
as Pierre Giffard wrote, but the deployment of a specific strategy 
based on the continuous investment of capital and the spectacular 
accumulation of commodities. The observations in the field already 
spoke clearly: “The theft carried out in these conditions - Zola had 
noted - is the work of women who have been strongly tempted; it 
is you who tempt them, you act with such violence on the desire 
of their coquetry, thereby they steal. In the end, the responsibility is 
yours” (Zola, 2009, p. 135). 
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Thus, to the arrangement of the products that in the novel will take 
on the changing form of a stormy sea, of promontories or of water-
falls, will correspond “a compact wave of heads” that flow “like an 
overflowing river into the middle of the hall” (Zola, 2014, p. 114), 
creating an immediate correspondence between the crowd of the 
department store and the equally feminine one of Le Bon. Because 
it will be Mouret himself who will execute the programme that Zola 
sketched out in the notebooks:
Did you want to see all the customers crowded in the same 
spot? – he will ask Bourdoncle. – I had a really good idea! 
I would never have forgiven myself… Don’t you understand 
that in this way I would have contained the crowd? A lady 
came in, went straight to where she needed to go, moved 
from petticoats to dresses, from dresses to cloaks, and then 
walked out without getting lost even for a moment! (p. 247). 
Then he explains what benefits creating such chaos will bring to 
the business: 
Firstly, this continual circulation of customers disperses 
them all over the shop, multiplies them, and makes them 
lose their heads; secondly, as they must be conducted from 
one end of the establishment to the other, if they want, for 
instance, a lining after having bought a dress, these journeys 
in every direction triple the size of the house in their eyes; 
thirdly, they are forced to traverse departments where they 
would never have set foot otherwise, temptations present 
themselves on their passage, and they succumb (p. 248). 
Octave Mouret’s arrangements pursue the establishment of a more 
subtle order and produce a sort of indirect but transparent etho-
poeia of the character who inhabits this places, namely the crowd 
of customers (Hamon, 1992). This is the perspective in which it 
might be interesting to take a leap forward to verify what happens 
when Julien Duvivier puts his signature on the film adaptation of 
Au Bonheur des Dames (1930): almost fifty years have passed from 
the publication of the novel and more than sixty from the begin-
ning of the construction works that from 1869 had involved the 
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expansion of the department stores Au Bon Marché in Paris. Yet, 
the elements of urban history that had intrigued Zola seem to be 
contemporary with the production and the corresponding historical 
transposition of the film. After all, it would not have been long until 
Louis Aragon’s paysan (1926) and Siegfried Kracauer’s reference 
to the influence that the models developed in the mid-nineteenth 
century would continue to exercise in the following century, would 
come across the same “civil war” between old commerce and 
large-scale distribution, so much so that we would have to consider 
1852 a truly decisive year. With the beginning of the Second Empire, 
in fact, the first real estate credit institutions were founded, the 
Senate approved the decree on the expropriations made necessary 
by the projects of the prefect Haussmann and Aristide Boucicaut 
became a partner in the haberdashery that soon revolutionized the 
first department store of history. It is precisely within the Cartesian 
system defined by these simple coordinates that the tragedy of the 
Baudu, the small traders of Zola and Duvivier, takes place. But the 
first impression is that the film director pushes the representation 
of progress into a much more critical perspective, resorting to a 
series of formal expedients such as the decomposition, superim-
position or repetition of images that cancel any distance between 
reality and the hallucinatory state. Except that the film itself seems 
to accredit a moralistic and comforting conception of commodities 
that was totally absent in Zola. In this sense, Zola had entrusted 
his protagonist with the role of the clerk: Denise showed the new 
designs, unrolled and rewound the fabrics, listened to the requests 
of customers and ran between the various departments to satisfy 
them, while now she merely plays the part of the living mannequin. 
In the film, therefore, on the one hand we are witnessing a com-
modification of bodies, but on the other, a specular push is pro-
duced that transfers the sensuality of the commodities described 
by Zola onto the movements of the actresses. Furthermore, Zola’s 
department store, where desire circulated freely from one floor 
to another and was exasperated by the overall dislocation of the 
products, is replaced by a crowd that in the film is dispersed in a 
discontinuous sequence of dressing rooms, hallways and studios 
that assign to the incursions of the spectator-voyeur the task of 
restoring a more traditional eroticism. This same shift then finds a 
coherent solution with a notable comparative impact in the film’s 
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finale. The director of Duvivier enters Baudu’s small shop to com-
municate to Denise that he will abandon the management of the 
department store: “I am a finished man – the captions make him 
say – I have created only pain and ruins”. And here is Denise star-
ring in a conversion that the novel could not grant her, running to 
the aid of Mouret armed with understanding (“You have followed 
progress, it alone is responsible”) while in her gaze a cruel intention 
appears, probably motivated by the same cynicism that now leads 
her to add: “Be proud, continue your work”. Thus, the film implicitly 
assures the same presumption of innocence to the commodities 
that it denies the shopclerk, resolving the historical contradiction 
with the most well-tested of moral solutions: Cherchez la femme!
In conclusion, one could come to suspect that from the point of 
view of historical and social analysis, the true protagonist of the 
novel is the thief. This alone would be enough to grasp the distance 
that separates it from the film adaptation, where the theft remains 
in the background, irrelevant, without ever resonating with the love 
story between Octave and Denise. Having to summarize it, where 
the novel entrusts the thief with the task of stirring Octave’s con-
science, who had never had any illusions about his own morality, 
the film resorts to the murderous fury of the old trader. The diegetic 
consistency of the thief, in this way, allows Zola to elaborate a much 
more articulated psychological representation of the director, with 
which it is not only death and the turn of events that make the spec-
tacle of commodities more equivocal, but the paradoxes of desire. 
A desire excited by the department store which for this very rea-
son will have to answer for it, because the thief returns a mirror 
image of the commodities that Zola plans in a conscious way from 
the very first notes, when he still simply notes how things could 
go and writes: “I could take from Octave’s mistress the woman of 
high extraction who steals because of temptation, the culminat-
ing point” (Zola, 2009, p. 80). Then some time later he adds that 
the same character will have to lead the story to the “culminating 
point of temptation: all pale, she ends up stealing, which no one 
notices” (p. 240). And finally, the real investiture takes place with 
the planning of a second theft, “like the sharpest note of the temp-
tation, of the madness of the new trade” (p. 352), which in order 
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to have a greater impact on the plot will have to entail a revision. 
Now the thief will stop playing the role of the woman who cannot 
afford to shop, to steal instead “with pockets full of money”, just “as 
one loves for the pleasure of loving, goaded on by desire, urged on 
by the species of kleptomania that her unsatisfied luxurious tastes 
had developed in her formerly at sight of the enormous and brutal 
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Form, Gender, Class and Race
The relationship of images with the forms of exploitation of the 
migrant labour force in the Italian countryside often tends to polar-
ize on two models that bring to mind an older tradition. On the one 
hand the worker is represented with his back bent and his fore-
head on the ground, while he picks tomatoes or pours them into 
bins, on the other hand he disappears in the barracks, where the 
images make us think of a form of life so anachronistic (without 
toilets, drinking water, heating) that it makes the most immediate 
return to modernity desirable, perhaps through an eviction order. 
Thus, swerving violently between the subject in chains and the indi-
vidual capable of surviving in the same way animals do, the farm-
hand continues to inherit his public and media representation from 
colonial propaganda, where the only two roles that were reserved 
for the native were those of the slave or the brute (Righettoni, pp. 
14-15). Pleonastic roles, as well as equally passive, since even the 
brute remains a slave to the laws of nature. But from this point of 
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view it could be interesting to compare the iconography of race to 
a specific historical and iconographic context of the determinants 
of gender, the asylum, where the undoubtedly passive ending of 
subjection to shackles or passions has sometimes represented 
a chance of liberation, assuming a form that we could define 
as deponent. 
Outside of metaphor, a truly emblematic case of the ambivalent 
relationship that images establish with the constitution of the sub-
ject, is provided by the story of Jane Avril, patient of Jean-Martin 
Charcot at the Salpêtrière in Paris and later star of the Folies 
Bergère, because it appears as though one of the most famous 
figures of hysteria, the arc of a circle, transmigrates in the famous 
poses in which Maurice Biais and Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec por-
tray the diva. But the adaptation of the body to the image need not 
be crowned with such an international success: in the figurative 
organization of the asylum (Didi-Huberman, 2003) the arch rep-
resents both the reason for the internment and the coherence of 
a diagnosis, the symptom and the form in which the patient can 
become curable. Perhaps it is in this sense that we can interpret the 
words of some very learned men, as Frantz Fanon defines them, 
according to whom the colonized is a hysteric (Fanon, 2004, p. 19). 
In fact, something similar could happen on the ship that is deport-
ing Kunta Kinte to Maryland, when the slave traders called taubob 
improvise on the bridge a music session and mock by dancing the 
movements of the Africans in chains.
Then they and the other armed toubob gestured for the 
men in chains to jump in the same manner. But when the 
chained men continued to stand as if petrified, the tou-
bobs’ grins became scowls, and they began laying about 
with whips. “Jump!” shouted the oldest woman suddenly, 
in Mandinka. She was of about the rains of Kunta’s mother 
Binta. Bounding out, she began jumping herself. “Jump!” she 
cried shrilly again, glaring at the girls and children, and they 
jumped as she did. “Jump to kill toubob!” she shrieked, her 
quick eyes flashing at the naked men, her arms and hands 
darting in the movements of the warrior’s dance. And then, 
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as her meaning sank home, one after another shackled pair 
of men began a weak, stumbling hopping up and down, their 
chains clanking against the deck. With his head down, Kunta 
saw the welter of hopping feet and legs, feeling his own 
legs rubbery under him as his breath came in gasps. Then 
the singing of the woman was joined by the girls. It was a 
happy sound, but the words they sang told how these hor-
rible toubob had taken every woman into the dark corners 
of the canoe each night and used them like dogs. “Toubob 
fa!” (Kill toubob) they shrieked with smiles and laughter. The 
naked, jumping men joined in: “Toubob fa!” Even the toubob 
were grinning now, some of them clapping their hands with 
pleasure. (Haley, 2007, p. 212).
The same need to camouflage conflict in adapting to the deponent 
forms of surrender, was referred to in the lesson that a former slave 
had to impart to his son on his deathbed. His words are reported 
in the first lines of Invisible Man, the novel by Ralph Ellison, who 
will then return to comment on them in the epilogue. The former 
slave is the grandfather of the narrator, who for these very words 
will judge him guilty of everything:
Son, after I’m gone I want you to keep up the good fight. I 
never told you, but our life is a war and I have been a traitor 
all my born days, a spy in the enemy’s country ever since I 
give up my gun back in the Reconstruction. Live with your 
head in the lion’s mouth. I want you to overcome ‘em with 
yeses, undermine ‘em with grins, agree ‘em to death and 
destruction, let ‘em swollen you till they vomit or bust wide 
open (Ellison, 1995, p. 18).
Living with your head in the lion’s mouth is the paradoxical prolon-
gation of war by other means, just like politics: yessirs, meekness 
or even that peculiar form of consent to the slave system that 
is declined in uncle tomism, thus appear in a totally new light. A 
more literal and bloody variation of the same strategy, could even 
be recognized in the practice of fiction (taqīya, ketmān) which 
in the dogmas of Shi’ism must characterize the behaviour of 
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those who are engaged in the war against unfaithful. Regarding 
the nineteen 9/11 attackers and some passages of the “spiritual 
guide” that was later found in the luggage of Muhammad Atta, 
Hans G. Kippenberg wrote:
In the super powered world of Western civilization, the true 
faithful must remain unknown. […] In the twentieth century 
the character of this duty has changed. Representatives of 
shī’a politics such as Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran or Ayatollah 
Fadlallah in Lebanon relaxed their absolute duty and made 
the practice of fiction depend on the situation of the battle 
for the Islamic order. Therefore they approached the more 
strategic Sunni conceptions about the legitimacy of con-
cealment and fiction (Kippenberg, 2007, p. 88).
Wanting to establish an exclusively formal comparison with 
Malcolm X’s terms, then, it is no longer clear what the house negrois 
doing now with its devotion to the house, if indeed he no longer has 
anything to do with the grudges that make the field negro fearsome. 
Two years before Ellison, in 1945, in relation to the play of light and 
the strategic resources of the stereotype, Suzanne Césaire wrote: 
“If my Antilles are so beautiful, it means that the great game of hide 
and seek has succeeded” (Césaire, 2009). 
But the mimetic enterprise of Martinique is not so far from the 
vicissitudes of those who today try to cross the border, as testified 
by the story of a young Iranian named Nusrat, who once left Tehran 
makes the journey that separates Turkey from the Greek island of 
Hios on a rubber dinghy. There he discovers that just twelve hours 
later he will have the opportunity to board a tourist ship bound for 
Patras, but despite having bought the ticket he remains an illegal 
immigrant, and as such the risk of being arrested shakes him to 
the point of preventing him from walking without constantly crash-
ing into parked cars. Then, when he reaches the dock despite 
everything, an image is there to rescue him: “I had seen it done 
in the movies – recalls Nusrat. – I wanted to make sure no one 
suspected me. I saw an old lady standing in line. I took her luggage 
and helped her load it” (Yaghimaian, 2005). His testimony is similar 
to that of another Iranian, Amir, who is inspired by the scenes of 
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Midnight Express to evade airport controls on his departure for the 
Netherlands (Khosravi, 2019, p. 117). 
These are examples that risk smuggling an image of the image 
that is excessively optional, however, as if the migrant could really 
use his own nudity to disguise it from time to time with the most 
appropriate costume for the search of salvation. On the contrary, it 
is precisely through the stereotype that the border regime positions 
the subject within the gender and class hierarchies, that is, in social 
reality, reserving a constitutive function for the military connota-
tions of the relationship between migration and images. From this 
point of view, the war evoked by the former slave on his deathbed 
represents the common substratum not only to the opposing log-
ics of border protection or humanitarian protection, a device that 
was introduced in Italy a few months before the no less “ humani-
tarians “ bombings of NATO in Serbia, but also with reference to the 
self-representations of the migrants themselves. Thus, those who 
return permanently to the village from the country of immigration 
will be the “veterans”, while those who only spend their holidays 
there become a “soldier on leave” (Sayad, 2002, p. 26). No longer 
an invader, nor necessarily a refugee, in fact, the migrant still con-
siders himself a fighter, albeit in hand-to-hand combat with his own 
destiny (Turco, 2018, p. 207). But can such a hand-to-hand really 
take place? Is it really possible to isolate the subjective image of the 
fighter from the scenarios in which the conflict is determined? And 
to what extent should the success of the fight not coincide with 
the success of the invasion or the asylum request, that is, with the 
implementation of a migratory project inevitably mortgaged by the 
spectacle of the border (Cuttitta, 2012)? 
It is in this sense that Fanon spoke of a third-person consciousness, 
understood as incorporation of all the images that the iconography 
of race has sedimented and continues to sediment throughout his-
tory: “cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetichism, racial defects, 
slave-ships” and above all exoticism, interpreted in this series by 
the character of an advertisement for a famous brand of powdered 
chocolate (Fanon, 2008, pp. 84-85). The figurative canon is handed 
down by a third person, precisely, because “the Negro is unaware 
of it as long as his existence is limited to his own environment; but 
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the first encounter with a white man oppresses him with the whole 
weight of his blackness” (p. 116). The subjective image thus man-
ifests itself in the contact with other bodies and other postures, 
in relation to certain historical relationships, of domination and 
production, including of race: “Below the corporeal schema I had 
sketched a historico-racial schema”, conclude Fanon (p. 84). 
The direct testimony of this schema and of the links that can exist 
between proprioception, the history of images and lived expe-
rience, will be provided by the Iranian writer and anthropologist 
Shahram Khosravi. 
I had just moved to Stockholm, where I had started taking 
courses in Social Anthropology at Stockholm University. 
On that October night, I left the sports hall on the univer-
sity campus at 10 pm. It was dark and cold. I headed to 
my room in the student residence, a few hundred metres 
away from the sports hall. There was a piece of woodland 
to the right of the footpath, part of a larger national park 
on the northern part of the campus. There was no-one else 
around. No more than 100 metres away from the sports hall 
I heard a sound, something like rustling leaves, coming from 
inside the woodland. I looked in that direction but could see 
nothing. The moment I turned back, I was hit in the face. 
I heard nothing, but felt something like a big stone being 
smashed on my head. After a while, I found myself thrown 
on the ground, half unconscious, my body lying on the freez-
ing asphalt and my face in a little pool of blood. I was afraid 
that more attacks would come, so I tried to protect my head 
with my arms. I heard some people standing around me. [...] 
They looked at me but did not touch me, abandoning me in 
my blood. When I had been shot and was lying in my blood, 
an image appeared in my head of a young black man on his 
knees, surrounded by several white men with baseball bats 
in their hands. The image was probably from a movie I had 
just seen, Mississippi Burning (Khosravi, 2010, pp. 78-83).
The dynamics of the accident will become clear only several days 
later, but in the meantime the injured body has already made it the 
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object of an implicit knowledge, as Fanon defines it. Khosravi writes: 
“I was still in hospital when another non-European immigrant was 
shot in Stockholm, and soon after him, another one and then one 
more. It soon turned out to be a case of a serial murderer who tar-
geted immigrants” (p. 80). If in the case of Nusrat and Amir the 
film scene has favoured the self-determination of the fighter (who 
manages to set sail from Hios or reach the Netherlands), Khosravi’s 
story can only confirm the latency of a historical-racial schema for 
which gestures, postures and events would already be preformed 
and therefore known, albeit implicitly. And just as Fanon’s scheme 
established a triangular relationship (“to the triple person”) between 
the gaze of the white man, the stereotypes of race and the weight 
of melanin, the predictive success of the scene evoked by Khosravi 
returns the evidence of an encounter (the one with his aggressor) 
mediated by a repertoire of equally canonical images:
I did not take the bullet personally for the simple reason that 
I had been shot for the same reason the young black man 
had been killed in that Mississippi town in the 1960s. It was 
the same reason that sent millions of Jews to the death 
chambers, that triggered the Tutsi massacre in Rwanda in 
1994, the killing of thousands of Bosnians in 1995 in the 
Srebrenica region, or the hundreds of Palestinian minors in 
Gaza in January 2009 (pp. 83-84).
The aggression that can be substantiated by the images of 
Mississippi Bridge is therefore impersonal, highlighting how the 
iconography of race not only mortgages the representation of the 
indigenous, the slave or the foreign labourer, but the same overall 
picture, even informing the aggressor’s gestures and the relation-
ship that the “white man” maintains with his own body. In the course 
of his investigation into the illegal hiring in the province of Foggia, 
Alessandro Leogrande was able to observe a phenomenon that 
perfectly illustrates the results of the intercorporeality connected 
to the “work camp”, where the Polish labourers tended to show the 
same faces photographed by Walker Evans in the years of the Great 
American Depression (Leogrande, 2016, pp. 96-97). During the trial, 
Leogrande had in fact noted how even the body of illegal job broker 
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and overseers was no longer able to escape the proxemics of slav-
ery, establishing a very close relationship between repetition and 
the coercive power of images:
I thought that that jailer pose, as a controller of human life, 
long reiterated, long lived, in the end one cannot but intro-
ject it, absorb it, make it become the foundation of one’s 
being in the world. It cannot help but dig into you, modify 
the features of your face. Looking at the men in the cage I 
saw that pose, not at all mitigated by prison. And I saw the 
same look of contempt and superiority, as if they were wait-
ing for nothing else than for the lawyers, the prison guards, 
the prosecutors, the judge, the carabinieri, to suddenly get 
up, as one, move the tables and chairs, loosen their ties and 
start picking tomatoes, artichokes, potatoes there on the 
floor... doubled over by exhaustion (p. 183).
In the becoming-body of images, therefore, we can also grasp the 
success of a disciplinary programme, which already for Marx con-
sisted precisely in making natural what was not before. Moreover, 
in an intersectional perspective such as the one we are exploring, 
alongside the determinants of gender and race, the relationship 
between images and the field of work will necessarily have to imply 
further consideration for the dimension of social class. Leogrande’s 
observation, in this sense, is supported by an anecdote that Furio 
Jesi relates in the chapter of Spartakus entitled to the symbols 
of power, where we are dealing with such a surprising adherence 
between the body and the image (as in the case of illegal job bro-
kers) that it makes the second more true than the first. 
Recently, and from personal experience: in devising a union 
propaganda sign, consisting of the figure of the master who 
oppresses the figures of the workers from above, the use of 
a drawing by Grosz (a quintessential fat “master”) with the 
superimposed photograph of the face of a master known 
to all has proved more effective, rather than the whole – 
albeit suggestive – photograph of the same master caught 
in a “royal” pose at his table. In fact, Grosz’s drawing gives 
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a symbolic dimension to the propaganda image, and the 
superimposed face determines the coincidence between 
symbol and everyday experience (Jesi, 2013, p. 51).
Because the knot still to be untied remains that of the relationship 
between image and experience. This seems to be the most appro-
priate measure to understand the inversion of colonial aesthetics in 
the great game of hide and seek, of the taubob choreography in the 
liberating dance of the slaves, of the war on invasion in the fight for 
life and of the subjection on the path to escape. In fact, the reiterated 
image smuggles the hierarchies of class, gender and race into the 
state of nature, but incurring the paradox of imposing a discipline 
that seems to be fulfilled and to be successful only in the construc-
tion of the subjects for whom the image was reserving a position of 
domain: the illegal job brokers and overseers, the “master” and his 
“royal” posture. To try to introduce and understand the reasons for 
this paradox, then, it is first necessary to refer to a letter from 1971 
in which Furio Jesi will offer to the publisher Ubaldini his monograph 
on Walter Benjamin’s thought. Two years earlier, in fact, in the type-
script of Spartakus, Benjamin’s name does not even appear, but it is 
really difficult not to compare the central definition of the book, that 
of revolt understood as the “point of intersection between the eter-
nal recurrence and once and for all” (p. 69), to the messianic open-
ness that characterizes the Theses on the Philosophy of History. Yet 
Benjamin had approached the theme of the eternal recurrence in a 
perspective entirely consistent with the terms in which Jesi himself 
elaborates his interpretation of Spartacism, which, as we shall see, 
will have to arrive at a categorization analogous if not exactly super-
imposable to that which opposes memory to involuntary memory. 
Without venturing into conjectures, however, I intend to limit myself 
to pointing out this consistency with the reference to a paragraph 
of Central Park in which Benjamin provides a definition of the eter-
nal recurrence that enters directly in resonance with the problem 
of the image and its repetition, as well as with Jesi’s analyses. 
Benjamin writes:
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The idea of eternal recurrence derived its luster from the 
fact that it was no longer possible, in all circum stances, 
to expect a recurrence of conditions across any interval of 
time shorter than that provided by eternity. The recurrence 
of quotidian constellations became gradually less frequent 
and there could arise, in conse quence, the obscure presen-
timent that henceforth one must rest content with cosmic 
constellations. Habit, in short, made ready to surrender 
some of its prerogatives (Benjamin, 2006, p. 167).
Just as the compulsion to repeat must ward off the dark presen-
timent of reality and death, it does not seem wrong to assume 
that the repetition of images can serve to mask the weakening of 
the hierarchical structures that the iconographic tradition has pro-
moted and reiterated. But of those same images it will be possible 
to have very different, even opposite, experiences and uses, based 
on the positioning of the subjects within the hierarchies that the 
image claimed to eternalize, attributing them to nature. Living with 
your head in the lion’s mouth, therefore, means being aware of the 
historical and spectral character of this reduction to the state of 
nature, amplifying its deception to accelerate the process of decom-
position, so that the lion ends up in the same trap it had set up to 
prevent the dark presentiment of one’s own insecurity: the denial 
of experience. But it is not necessary to suspect that Jesi has con-
cealed the presence of Benjamin in the palimpsest of Spartakus, 
because from this point of view the description of what happens to 
the lion (or to the taubob, to the illegal job brokers, to the white man, 
to psychiatric knowledge or to the “master”, through a movement 
adhering to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic) is entrusted in the text 
to an equally pertinent quote from Lukács, who wrote: “A bourgeois 
profession as a form of life signifies, in the first place, the primacy 
of ethics in life: life dominated by something that recurs systemati-
cally and regularly, something that happens again and again in obe-
dience to a law, something that must be done without concern for 
desire or pleasure” (Lukács, 2010, p. 75). Quote that Jesi renders 
even more enlightening for our theme, when he explains: “Within 
bourgeois society – is his paraphrase – the law of eternal recur-
rence determines the mode of crystallization 
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of ideological formulas, at least in the eye of who observes them” 
(Jesi, 2013, p. 4). 
Of the image, therefore, the eye of the subject that the image is 
favouring (but sometimes also that of the subordinates – and this 
is the limit of the revolt, according to Spartakus) does not grasp the 
demonic or spectral dimension, preparing to identify it with reality 
and thus ending up suffocating the experience in a comfortable 
dependence to the functioning of certain automatisms. But pre-
cisely in relation to race, one would say, the recoil of the image on 
the distribution of the parts in reference to the identitarian strategy 
of the observer and the mimetic strategy of who is observed, has 
nothing accidental, indeed. The temptation would rather be that of 
making it a paradigmatic case of the so-called burden of the white 
man, that is, of the processes through which the forms of life forbid-
den from the historical and always current transition to capitalism 
are projected into the new anthropological function assigned to the 
black man, forcing him to symbolize everything that the European 
workforce has never stopped wanting and that only racism, now, 
finally allows it to attack (Jordan, 1974). Such a desire could also 
be expressed in the nostalgia for the Renaissance cosmos and its 
metamorphoses, assigning to them the detrimental connotations 
of bestiality or enslavement to the despotism of nature. 
Leading us to one of the most emblematic sites of this assignment 
is a testimony by Stefan Zweig, who recalls how at the time of his 
early adolescence more metamorphoses were taking place in the 
world than had been produced in the last two centuries. Indeed, the 
period is that between the gestation of the Prélude à l’après-midi 
d’un faune and the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago, the 
arrest of Captain Dreyfus and the debut of the cinématographe, the 
testing of the radio and the invention of mammaplasty, the isola-
tion of the plague and the dream of Irma, the patient who would 
have shown Freud the path of psychoanalysis. Meanwhile, in Paris, 
the newborn psychology of crowds did not neglect to associate 
the behaviour of the mass with the female temperament, but even 
with their disruption these first signs of rupture should not have 
disturbed the aesthetic formation of young Viennese. To the crisis 
of traditional values, instead, to the bodies that conspired under 
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frock coats and whalebones, to Isadora Duncan’s bare feet and to 
the spectacle of the chambres separées reserved for the increas-
ingly scandalous dinners of the polite bourgeoisie, Zweig’s circle 
would have opposed a restraint quite comparable to that of those 
who polish silverware under aerial bombardments. A year older 
than them, the only patron of the Café Central who did not have to 
derogate from the passion for the present, despite having suffered 
it in a controversial way, to say the least, was Otto Weininger, who 
attributed to the fickleness of the times two partially interchange-
able names: that of woman and that of Jew. Because the Jew and 
the woman constantly change shape, he argues in his dissertation, 
adapting to the environment with a predisposition to chamele-
ontism that opposes them to the values perpetuated by the male 
character. Of course, even the genius can change indefinitely, but in 
his case the transformation is made legitimate by the interior mas-
tery of all possible forms, which therefore do not alter the integrity 
of the subject authorized to utilize them. While he confesses that he 
cannot renounce the principle of continuity, in short, the only met-
amorphosis that Weininger seems to save from the passiveness 
of the woman or the parasitism of the Jew, is borrowed from the 
meaning that the term assumed in Leibniz’s monadology, where 
everything that happens must correspond to the unfolding of an 
interiority that has already implied it. For the rest, only abstinence 
holds true, the only way in which a man can force a woman to take 
leave of the changing circumstances of coitus. Not for nothing, 
in the same months in which he was working on his dissertation, 
Weininger completed the enthusiastic study of Peer Gynt, the story 
of the child-hero on whom Ibsen had not failed to impose the mul-
tiple metaphorical features of the pig, the donkey, the reindeer, the 
wolf, the goat, the bear, the lamb, the bull, the owl, the mouse, the 
louse, the hawk, the rooster and the cuckoo, but always in the name 
of a life strictly en garçon, without letting him be possessed by that 
“defiant denial of reality” that in Sex and Character coincides with 
love (Weininger, 2005, p. 279). And to the objection that in a world 
populated exclusively by Peer Gynt epigones, our species would 
quickly become extinct, Weininger would have responded with the 
utmost contempt for anyone “who cannot image the Earth without 
having men on it scratching about”. 
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Nietzsche had already argued that man was antiquated, but only 
to advocate going beyond him in a direction clearly indicated by 
the need to live beyond good and evil, like the flowering tree. On 
the contrary, in the notebook he writes during his last travels before 
committing suicide at the age of twenty-three, Weininger extends 
the hatred of mutations to representatives of the animal world and 
plants, identifying them with vulgarity and disease. Because in him, 
the censor of metamorphosis who confessed to feeling horror at 
all that in Goethe has too much in common with Ovid, every judg-
ment shows the scars of the most desperate aversion to the natu-
ral ground of existence (Lessing, 2021). Thus, in Sex and Character, 
we could really witness the violent clarification of the relationship 
between the construction of gender and race and the burden of 
the individual subjected to “a new intellectual system whose fun-
damental assumption was the separation between human beings 
and the rest of nature”, according to Moore’s definition.
Not for nothing, it is precisely an extraordinary mutability to charac-
terize the protagonist of the first Italian comic strip set in the colo-
nies, Bilbolbul, created by Attilio Mussino in 1908 and published on 
the “Corriere dei Piccoli” until 1933. In fact, at the heart of his adven-
tures lies the principle “that his forms, like those of other charac-
ters and parts of his world, constantly change” (Stefanelli, 2019). 
Unlike Weininger’s genius, however, Bilbolbul is not in the least able 
to dominate his own metamorphosis, which on the contrary he 
undergoes: if he sprouts wings on his feet or turns into a donkey it 
is only because the narrator has used metaphors to which its met-
amorphoses give a literal meaning. Due to his delay with respect 
to the figurative and more advanced use of language, Bilbolbul can 
immediately remind of the page of Allegories of Reading in which 
Paul De Man tells:
asked by his wife whether he wants to have his bowling 
shoes laced over or laced under, Archie Bunker answers with 
a question: “What’s the difference?” Being a reader of sub-
lime simplicity, his wife replies by patiently explaining the 
difference between lacing over and lacing under, whatever 
this may be, but provokes only ire. “What’s the difference” 
did not ask for difference but means instead “I don’t give 
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a damn what the difference is.” [...] Archie Bunker, who is a 
great believer in the authority of origins (as long, of course, 
as they are the right origins) muddles along in a world where 
literal and figurative meanings get in each other’s way, 
though not without discomforts (De Man, 1979, p. 9).
Even Bilbolbul’s misadventures can be traced back to the tension 
between Mrs. Bunker’s “sublime simplicity” and the trust “in the 
authority of origins (as long, of course, as they are the right origins)”. 
The woman and the little savage remain at the mercy of words, 
while Archie Bunker trusts in the authority that binds them to an 
intention. The colonized, in other words, does not control figuration, 
whereas the Italian reader cannot realistically suspect that the right 
origins of the expression “put wings on your feet” ere not referring 
to image of an exceptionally fast run. The mutability corresponds 
to a defect, in any case, that only the recognition and true identity 
of an expression can correct. In Lukács’ terms, then, we are again 
dealing with the principle that “life itself is dominated by everything 
that recurs according to a system and a rule”. On the contrary, adds 
Jesi, recognizing the still ideological character of the crystallized 
forms means giving back to images the possibility of adhering to 
life, as “modules of knowledge and experience”. It should therefore 
not come as a surprise the ones to grasp this possibility in refer-
ence to the iconography of race are the slave and the migrant, who 
are subject to a gaze that appeases or deludes itself to appease 
through images the “dark presentiment” of their own instability, their 
own burden. Because what “the memory preserves or rediscovers 
– writes Jesi – is only sediment”, even within the images, of which 
it is quite important to qualify the becoming-body, the becoming 
“part of the living organism like a digested food”, generating the 
presence of what they conceal and the removal of what they show. 
For example, Jesi adds, “if in a bygone time a face inspired authen-
tic love or authentic hate (or respect or contempt), the remember-
ing of the lineaments of that face may remain or return with clarity 
and precision in memory but it will be past – in the sense of a dead, 
imprisoning past – while the genuine experience of love or hate will 
not be remembered; only its circumstances and semblance will be, 
and it will endure, alive”. But if the memory of that face is still so 
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beautiful and decisive, Suzanne Césaire could say, if the iconogra-
phy of race still blinds the gaze we adopt to observe the life of the 
new slaves in the countryside and at the back of the barracks, then 
it means that the great game of hide and seek continues.
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